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EDITORIAL
What do we know about audit quality? An intriguing 
question for which society seems to have a ready-
made answer, while to the audit industry is much less 
clear about what it takes to get there. Society would 
seem to impose a zero-mistake tolerance on the au-
dit industry.  Surely society does not want to pay the 
price that would take audit quality to a level where 
quality is irreproachable. For that matter, it is not 
even clear that auditees who pay a premium fee get 
better quality. For instance, while industry speciali-
zation tends to have a positive effect on audit fees 
(Numan & Willekens, 2012a), competitive pressure 
may inflict a negative effect on quality.  Numan and 
Willekens (2012b) report a negative impact on audit 
quality delivered by an auditor who faces competitive 
pressure from competitors who resemble the focal au-
ditor in its range of activities. These results seem to 
suggest that society varies the price it is willing to pay 
for an audit. To the extent that audit fee is associated 
with the quality of the audit, it would appear that au-
dit quality is not uniform across audit engagements. 
If that is the case how should we interpret the expec-
tations of society with regard to audit quality? What 
determines audit quality? When is audit quality (in)
sufficient? However, before we can even begin to an-
swer that question we first need to agree on what ex-
actly is audit quality. Is it possible to measure audit 
quality? 
During its first conference, the Foundation for Au-
diting Research1 (FAR) takes issue with exactly this 
topic: “What do we know about audit quality?” At the 
conference academics as well as practitioners gave 
their take on what makes audits good. This issue of 
MAB elaborates on these topics and gives the floor to 
the discussants of the papers that Jere Francis, Mar-
leen Willekens, Suraj Srinivasan and Robert Knechel 
presented at the FAR conference, May 9 and 10, 2016. 
Liesbeth Bruynseels, Christine Nolder, Jeroen van 
Raak, and Joost van Buuren discussed their papers 
during the conference. An exciting feature of the FAR 
conference was the contribution of auditors from 
practice, an auditee, as well as the audit oversight 
body. They took the floor in the panel, as presenters 
in front of the class room or as an interested auditor 
present in the class room.   
This MAB issue opens with a paper by Liesbeth 
Bruynseels and Herman van Brenk that presents a dis-
cussion of the presentation Jere Francis gave. Jere’s 
discussion at the conference focused on his study 
(Francis, Pinnuck, and Watanabe, 2014) that reveals 
that auditors have a particular style of auditing lead-
ing to the observation that (1) two companies in the 
same industry and year indeed have more compara-
ble earnings when they are audited by the same Big 4 
firm, and (2) that companies audited by the same Big 
4 auditor will have more comparable earnings than 
companies audited by the same Non-Big 4 auditor. 
The first finding is according to Bruynseels and Van 
Brenk’s discussion at odds with the idea that firms 
differ and that therefore similarities in their financial 
statements should not be observed.  Francis, Pinnuck 
and Watanabe (2014) attribute the second observa-
tion to the fact that Big 4 auditors have more resourc-
es to standardize their audits. However, in their dis-
cussion Liesbeth Bruynseels and Herman van Brenk, 
propose that auditees may select auditors with par-
ticular styles. 
Marleen Willekens presented her working paper co-
authored with Ann Gaeremynck and Robert Knechel 
(Gaeremynck, Willekens & Knechel, 2016). She took 
issue with the (efficient) production of audits. What 
is efficient in this regard? This is by no means a 
straightforward question to ask unless one assumes 
that quality is fixed. While we know that assumption 
is not fulfilled in reality answering what is efficient 
pertains to two important dimensions: efficient at the 
micro-economic level and at the societal level. Wille-
kens examines audit efficiency from the micro-eco-
nomic level. The paper demonstrates that partner ten-
ure is positively affecting audit efficiency. 
Interestingly it appears that the work clients execute 
in preparation of the audit work has a negative rela-
tion with efficiency. One wonders how and whether 
this finding extends to how well the auditee has or-
ganized its internal controls. After all, the auditor can 
more or less depend on these internal controls in de-
signing its audit conditional on how well the controls 
operate.  Willekens et al. (2016) have also examined 
that question and find that “no efficiencies are real-
ized by relying on internal controls”. Christine Nold-
er and Sytse Duiverman discuss in this issue the pa-
What practitioners and academics 
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per Marleen Willekens presented and pay specific 
attention how future research can build on the work 
of Gaeremynck, Willekens and Knechel (2016) to en-
hance our knowledge of efficiency. Among other rec-
ommendations they advise future researchers to pur-
sue a research agenda that takes issue with office 
levels factors to enhance our understanding of what 
are the underlying forces that determine efficiency. 
Suraj Srinivasan presented a paper on audit quality co-
authored with Shiva Rajgopal and Xin Zheng (Srini-
vasan, Rajgopal & Zheng, 2016). The central topic of 
their paper is to examine how well empirical audit 
quality measures stand validity and reliability tests. 
Their paper provides a rather bleak picture of how well 
the existing measures stand the tests.  Jeroen van Raak 
and Ulrike Thürheimer propose that the way ahead is 
using data researchers collect from the audit firms, 
rather than using data that is publicly made available. 
They present in their paper some important examples 
of how this can be accomplished. Their paper will help 
future researchers in their endeavors to capture the 
phenomenon of audit quality.
Robert Knechel presented his paper co-authored with 
Carlin Dowling and Robin Moroney (Knechel, Dowl-
ing & Moroney, 2016) at the conference where he 
asked: Does tougher enforcement by regulators entail 
higher quality? Knechel argues that clear limits exist 
as to the extent that enforcements can help improve 
audit quality. Joost van Buuren and Annie Wong ex-
amine these limits in their discussion. They suggest 
that the authors further examine how cooperation be-
tween regulators and audit may affect audit quality.
In a panel consisting of Deloitte partner and Head of 
Audit Marco van der Vegte, AFM director Barbara Ma-
joor, Non-executive director Jan Nooitgedagt and re-
searcher Marleen Willekens it is discussed what each 
of these stakeholder believe what it takes to enhance 
the meaning of the audit function. Philip Wallage 
summarizes this discussion. Marco van der Vegte fo-
cuses in his discussion on the importance of extend-
ing our knowledge of the audit process, i.e., opening 
the “black box” of the audit. By studying how the at-
tention of audit work is distributed over the process-
es and the care with which the processes are accom-
plished we can extend our knowledge of whether and 
how the structure of the auditing processes affects 
the use of information. Barbara Majoor focused her 
attention on the organization cultural dimension. 
She argues there is much to learn about how culture 
is related to audit quality. Culture may pertain to au-
ditor and auditee. Jan Nooitgedagt calls for innova-
tion in the profession. He has yet to see how automa-
tion is going to affect the audit function. Marleen 
Willekens believes that we need to learn much more 
about input-output models to understand what de-
termines the quality of the audit. In fact the call of 
Marleen comes very close to the call of Marco van der 
Vegte where he referred to the audit process. The pan-
el is also asked to comment on the role of audit com-
mittees. It appears that audit committee members of-
ten have no accounting/financial background. This 
comes at a cost!
During the conference the auditing industry took the 
floor to elaborate on what it expects to learn from re-
search and how it sees their own role in strengthen-
ing the bridge between practice and science. To this 
end the industry was represented by Egbert Eeftink 
(KPMG), Michael de Ridder (PwC), and Marco van 
der Vegte (Deloitte). Olof Bik provides a summary of 
the ideas they put forward. Michael de Ridder argued 
that there can be no doubt, the audit industry has to 
change.  While the sector has its own ideas of what 
steps to take, it would be important to know what 
measures (do) not work and why. For instance what 
does it mean if auditors get more involved with non-
executive directors and untie their relation with man-
aging directors?
Marco van der Vegte believes that the communication 
on what an audit and its quality entails should be stud-
ied so as to provide auditors guidance to meet the ex-
pectations of financial statement users. Egbert Eeftink 
believes that auditing research could fill the gap be-
tween disciplines. Research can help to identify areas 
that auditors may want to emphasize.
This special issue closes with a remarkable observation 
made by Willem Buijink. He states that the profession 
is not so much in trouble, but that stakeholders seem 
to feel that audit is in trouble. That said, Buijink does 
believe that auditing has a great future ahead and that 
the profession would benefit a lot if we extend our 
knowledge of auditing! 
As the work by Numan and Willekens (2012a and b) 
suggests users and producers of audited statements 
alike may have alternating opinions of what is good 
audit quality. The discussion that we had at 9 and 10 
May 2016 at Nyenrode University has confirmed this 
idea. In fact during the conference it became clear that 
a third group has alternating opinions as well: the ac-
ademics. That said all of the participants agree that we 
can extend our knowledge significantly if academics 
and the audit industry join forces in examining audit 
practices.  This issue of MAB demonstrates the large 
array of opportunities lying ahead of us. 
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1 Introduction
In their paper “Auditor Style and Financial Statement 
Comparability”, Francis, Pinnuck, and Watanabe 
(2014) (hereafter: FPW) investigate whether financial 
reporting outcomes are influenced by the audit firm’s 
unique audit style. They measure style at the audit firm 
level, assuming that differences in audit styles are a 
consequence of firm-specific working rules, guidelines, 
and templates (i.e., audit methodology) that influence 
the interpretation and application of auditing stand-
ards. FPW examine the effect of audit style differenc-
es by analysing earnings comparability of clients au-
dited by the same auditor in the same industry and 
fiscal year (i.e., the closeness of two firms’ reported 
earnings). The findings of this study, and his ongoing 
research, were presented by Jere Francis at the Foun-
dation for Auditing Research (FAR) Conference on 
May 9, 2016. FPW’s findings indicate that, despite the 
existence of general auditing standards, each audit 
firm has its own unique audit style and, as such, they 
provide evidence of “a new channel through which au-
ditor characteristics affect audited financial state-
ments” (Francis, Pinnuck & Watanabe, 2014, p. 607). 
This interesting finding generates numerous opportu-
nities for future research on the drivers and conse-
quences of different audit styles.
In our discussion, we zoom in on FPW’s research ques-
tion and findings, and call for further research on the 
factors that shape and define audit styles. Throughout 
this article, we use the analogy with Belgian beers, as 
they can be categorized in style groups according to 
colour, flavour, strength, ingredients, production 
method, recipe, history, or origin (Wikipedia, n.d.). Just 
like there is no single ingredient that determines a 
beer’s aroma, appearance, and flavour, there are nu-
merous factors at the level of the audit firm, office, au-
dit team and individual auditor that shape and define 
audit styles. We argue that a thorough understanding 
of the drivers and financial reporting consequences of 
these unique styles is important as audit firms may use 
these insights to improve and safeguard audit quality. 
Specifically, audit firms may optimize their style by 
changing the ingredients (e.g., the audit team, the in-
dividual audit partner) or production process (e.g., au-
dit methodology) in order to improve their audit qual-
ity. Therefore we need to dig deeper into the 
specificities of audit styles at various levels of analysis 
(firm, office, team, individual auditor) and its influenc-
es on financial reporting and audit quality. 
We structure our article as follows. In section 2, we dis-
If auditors are like Belgian beers, 
which style would you prefer?
Liesbeth Bruynseels and Herman van Brenk
SUMMARY  Recent research by Francis, Pinnuck, and Watanabe (2014) has shown 
that financial reporting outcomes are influenced by the audit firm’s unique audit 
style. They argue that audit firm styles are driven by their “unique set of internal 
working rules that guide the auditor’s application of accounting and auditing stand-
ards” (Francis, Pinnuck & Watanabe, 2014). In our discussion, we zoom in on this 
study and call for further research on the factors that determine audit styles. Specif-
ically, we emphasize the importance of extending this research from the audit firm 
level to the level of the audit office, audit team, and individual auditor. We conclude 
with the notion that intense collaboration between audit firms and academia is in-
strumental in opening the black box of audit styles to extend our knowledge on the 
root causes and drivers of audit quality.  
PRACTICAL RELEVANCE  Extending our knowledge on the factors that shape audit 
styles as well as their effects on the audit process and audit quality is important to 
improve (or safeguard) audit quality. Specifically, a deeper understanding of audit 
styles at the level of the audit firm, audit team or individual auditor and its implica-
tions for the audit process and audit quality might assist audit firms in optimizing 
their client-firm matching, audit methodology, audit team compositions as well as 
audit staff hiring, performance appraisal, and promotion decisions.
SPECIAL ISSUE
Discussion of “Auditor style and financial statement comparability” by 
Francis, Pinnuck, and Watanabe (2014)
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cuss recent research on audit styles at the level of the 
audit firm and office, and call for research that inves-
tigates audit styles at the audit team and individual 
level. In this section, we provide a summary of FPW’s 
findings as well as a discussion of their study. Based 
on prior research, we also provide insights into contex-
tual factors that are likely to influence individual au-
dit styles. In section 3, we provide suggestions to open 
the black box of audit styles and highlight the need for 
a strong collaboration between the auditing profession 
and academia. Finally, we conclude our article in sec-
tion 4. 
2 Audit styles at various levels of analysis 
2.1  Summary of FPW’s findings on audit styles at the audit firm 
level
FPW examine the effects of audit styles on financial 
statement comparability at the audit firm level. They 
assume that each Big 4 firm has its own audit style as 
a result of unique in-house working rules (i.e., firm-
specific audit methodology) that guide the auditors in 
interpreting and applying auditing and accounting 
standards. As such, they expect a pair of companies au-
dited by the same Big 4 firm to have more comparable 
earnings than a pair of companies audited by two dif-
ferent Big 4 firms. Using U.S. data from 1987 through 
2011, FPW measure accounting comparability in three 
ways. First, they examine cross-sectional similarities of 
total and abnormal accruals for firm-pairs in the same 
industry using the same Big 4 auditor versus firm-pairs 
with two different Big 4 auditors. Second, they meas-
ure the degree to which earnings of a pair of compa-
nies in the same industry and audited by the same Big 
4 auditor, covary across time. Third, they test whether 
audit firm indicator variables are helpful in explaining 
the level of accruals reported by each individual client 
firm. In a nutshell, FPW’s findings show that two com-
panies in the same industry and year indeed have more 
comparable earnings when they are audited by the 
same Big 4 audit firm, which suggests that audit cli-
ents are subject to specific audit firm styles. 
In the second part of the study, FPW test whether com-
panies audited by the same Big 4 auditor have more 
comparable earnings than companies audited by the 
same Non-Big 4 auditor. FPW expect that Big 4 audit 
firms have a greater capacity to incur the fixed costs as-
sociated with developing and implementing in-house 
standardized rules for implementing auditing and ac-
counting standards compared to Non-Big 4 firms. 
Moreover, as a result of their larger and more dispersed 
staff, Big 4 firms are also likely to have a greater need 
for controls that guide professionals in interpreting 
these standards than Non-Big 4 firms. Consistent with 
this line of reasoning, FPW report weak but signific-
ant evidence that audit styles at Big 4 firms indeed have 
a greater effect on accounting comparability, com-
pared to audit styles at Non-Big 4 firms.
2.2 Discussion of FPW’s findings
Overall, FPW’s findings are important for our under-
standing of the role of large audit firms in producing 
financial statement comparability. Although FPW pro-
vide some insights into the term “audit style”, many 
questions are spurred by their findings, providing op-
portunities for future research. For example, ‘what is 
an audit style?’, ‘why would an audit style occur at the 
firm level given that auditors and audit engagements 
are unique?’, ‘what are the drivers of audit styles?’, 
‘what are the differences in audit styles between audit 
firms?’, ‘do audit styles influence the audit process and 
ultimately audit quality?’, ‘how do different styles be-
tween audit partner and engagement team members 
interact with the style of the client (e.g., negotiation 
strategy)?’, ‘are audit styles observable for the client 
and do they influence auditor retention decisions or 
audit fees?’, ‘how can audit firms mitigate any adverse 
effects of audit styles?’. Following our analogy between 
audit styles and Belgian beers, we call for further re-
search into the ingredients, processes, and circum-
stances that lead to specific flavours, types, and styles 
as well as variations in the level of quality of the deliv-
ered product. 
On a more critical note, the finding that financial re-
porting outcomes are influenced by audit firm style 
seems to be at odds with the idiosyncratic nature of 
audit engagements. The outcome of an audit is not 
only influenced by audit firm policies and internal 
working rules, but also by client characteristics, audit 
teams, and the timing and extent of planned audit pro-
cedures (Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik & Ve-
lury, 2013). One of FPW’s robustness tests provide sup-
port for this view by showing that the audit style effect 
does not apply to non-routine transitory transactions. 
Hence, future research may zoom in on the factors that 
shape audit styles at the level of the audit team and in-
dividual auditor, and on identifying specific (decision-
making) contexts where style effects are most likely to 
occur and influence audit quality.  
The results of FPW also indicate that companies au-
dited by the same Big 4 auditor have more compara-
ble earnings than companies audited by the same Non-
Big 4 auditor. Although their explanation for this 
finding seems logical (i.e., the greater capacity of Big 4 
auditors to incur the fixed costs in developing in-house 
standardized rules), there might be alternative expla-
nations for this effect, such as differences in team com-
position and client acceptance decisions between firms 
or self-selection of certain types of professionals and 
clients into different types of audit firms. 
Following up on the issue of self-selection, FPW ac-
knowledge that clients are not randomly assigned to 
SPECIAL ISSUE
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an auditor, rather, they choose one. In their study, 
this issue is addressed by considering motives for a 
client choosing a particular auditor based on its ac-
counting production function. Specifically, they re-
moved firm-pairs that were audited by industry spe-
cialist auditors from the sample, as well as firm-pairs 
that constituted of close competitors. Although the 
main results remained unchanged, these tests did not 
consider other audit firm-specific factors that might 
influence auditor-client matching. As mentioned pre-
viously, audit firms are likely to attract auditing pro-
fessionals with a certain profile and set of skills and 
traits (i.e., individual style) and have their own poli-
cies regarding client acceptance. Furthermore, as sug-
gested by participants at the FAR conference, client-
partner matching is an important quality monitoring 
tool for audit firms. That is, in assigning audit clients 
to audit partners, firms take the profiles of both the 
client and the audit partner into consideration (e.g., 
personality, expertise, past experience) when assess-
ing the appropriateness of a specific match. This view 
is consistent with prior research on auditor-client ne-
gotiating (Fu, Tan & Zhang, 2011; Brown & Wright, 
2008; Hatfield, Agoglia & Sanchez, 2008), showing 
that potential effectiveness and efficiency gains are 
achieved when there is a match between auditor ne-
gotiating experience and client negotiating style. 
Overall, this line of thought supports our call for fur-
ther research on audit style effects at the team and 
individual auditor level. Indeed, future research is 
needed to explore various audit styles and its relation-
ships with client-partner matching decisions, the au-
dit process, and audit quality.
Finally, although FPW assume that firm-specific audit 
styles are shaped by standardized interpretations and 
applications of auditing and accounting standards, the 
study remains silent on the various types of audit 
styles, the specific aspects of audit styles that are most 
likely to influence financial statement outcomes, and 
how audit styles differ among audit firms. A reason for 
the difficulty in addressing these issues might be that 
audit styles are not readily observable. This is consist-
ent with the view that a financial statement audit is 
considered a credence good where outcome quality 
(and hence also audit style) is unobservable (Knechel 
et al., 2013; Causholli & Knechel, 2012). Unlike Bel-
gian beers where style differences are apparent, it is 
hard to define and observe variations in audit styles 
and audit outcomes among the Big 4 firms because 
they all use the same language in their audit reports 
and have the reputation of a high quality global ac-
counting service provider. Of note, the recent develop-
ment of disclosing key audit matters in the auditor’s 
report creates opportunities for large audit firms to 
show their audit style (IAASB, 2015), providing new 
avenues to study such style differences.
2.3 Audit styles at the office level
Kawada (2014) extends the research of FPW by analys-
ing the effects of audit styles on earnings comparabil-
ity at the local office level. He shows that two companies 
in the same industry and year have more comparable 
earnings when they are audited by the same local Big 
4 office compared to firms audited by different offices 
of the same audit firm. These results suggest that the 
audit firm style effects documented by FPW are (at 
least partially) attributable to practices at the audit of-
fice level. Kawada (2014) explains the existence of au-
dit styles at the office level by referring to localized 
training (i.e., conducted by each practice office) on the 
implementation of the firm’s overall audit methodol-
ogy. Although the study by Kawada (2014) does not 
consider audit styles at the audit partner level, he 
points at the importance of the individual auditor in 
the context of financial statement comparability. This 
is consistent with some archival auditing studies (Har-
dies, Breesch & Branson, 2016; Aobdia, Lin & Petacchi, 
2015; Knechel, Vanstraelen & Zerni, 2015; Gul, Wu & 
Yang, 2013; Chen, Sun & Wu, 2010), which show that 
an analysis of audit partner characteristics provides a 
stronger test in explaining audit quality differences 
compared to analysing auditor characteristics meas-
ured at the office or audit firm level. Hay, Knechel, and 
Willekens (2014, p. 351) similarly emphasize the im-
portance of the individual auditor and state that “be-
cause the audit is a human activity conducted by indi-
vidual auditors, the quality of a specific audit is 
conditional on individual auditor characteristics and 
the incentives that auditors face”. This is also consist-
ent with prior research, which usually focuses on the 
individual auditor as a unit of analysis when investi-
gating auditor judgement and decision making (Bon-
ner, 2008; Nelson & Tan, 2005; Libby & Luft, 1993; 
Wallman, 1996). Therefore, as we will argue, the audit 
is likely influenced by audit styles at the individual or 
team level, perhaps even more heavily than audit styles 
at the firm or office level.
2.4  Audit styles at the team and individual level: A fruitful ave-
nue for future research
Although factors at the firm and office level are impor-
tant in determining audit styles, we argue that it is 
equally (if not more) important to also consider fac-
tors at the team and individual level. As with Belgian 
beers, it is not just the brewery (i.e., the audit firm) that 
determines the style but also the ingredients (e.g., the 
client, the audit team, and the individual audit part-
ner) and the production method (i.e., audit methodol-
ogy). At the team level, review styles and team leader-
ship styles are important factors that influence the 
audit process and ultimately audit quality. Review 
styles refer to individual differences in working prac-
tices and preferences regarding the review of audit 
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working papers. Prior research shows that there is sub-
stantial variation in review styles at the audit partner 
level (Pierce & Sweeney, 2005; Gibbins & Trotman, 
2002), and that audit partners and managers change 
their review style based on the contextual factors of the 
audit engagement (e.g., client risk, time budget pres-
sure, experience, goals of preparers). As Rich, Solomon, 
and Trotman (1997) argue, junior auditors even antic-
ipate the manager’s review style and ex-ante stylize the 
content and format of their working papers by choos-
ing the type of audit evidence, how it is gathered and 
interpreted, selecting documentation type, and deter-
mining the order and frame in which the evidence is 
presented. Overall, these findings indicate that review 
styles are different at the team level and that team 
members respond to the style of the reviewer by chang-
ing the extent and documentation of the audit work 
which potentially affects audit quality.
Team leadership styles refer to differences in the way 
the (senior) manager or audit partner leads the audit 
team. Prior research in management shows that team 
leaders play an important role in team performance 
and effectiveness by composing the team, structuring 
the work, providing feedback, challenging team mem-
bers, and managing relationships within the organisa-
tion (Morgeson, DeRue & Karam; 2010; Burke et al., 
2006). Similarly, prior research in auditing highlights 
the importance of audit team leadership (e.g., Pierce & 
Sweeney, 2005; Otley & Pierce, 1996; Kelley & Mar-
gheim, 1990), and the role of the auditor-in-charge (e.g. 
Bik and Hooghiemstra 2016; Gold, Gronewold & Sal-
terio, 2014; Sweeney, Arnold & Pierce, 2010; Jenkins, 
Deis, Bedard & Curtis, 2008). For example, Otley and 
Pierce (1996) show that a leadership style character-
ized by high levels of consideration towards junior au-
ditors is associated with less dysfunctional audit be-
haviour (an example of dysfunctional audit behavior 
is the superficial review of documents) as it generates 
mutual trust, respect, and motivation. Given that these 
studies provide evidence of the influence of team lead-
ership styles on the behaviour of team members, we 
expect team leadership as well as characteristics of the 
auditor-in-charge to have a substantial effect on audit 
styles, and subsequently on audit quality.
At the individual level, audit styles are likely to be de-
termined by factors such as personality and cognitive 
styles. Cognitive styles refer to individual differences 
in the acquisition, processing, storing, and transmis-
sion of information (Fuller & Kaplan, 2004; Gul, 1984) 
and are typically influenced by specific task attributes, 
personality traits, and experience (Bryant, Murthy & 
Wheeler, 2009; Pincus, 1990; Bernardi, 1994; Gul, 
1984). Examples of cognitive style aspects that have 
been shown to have an effect on the audit process and 
audit outcomes are moral development (Bernardi, 
1994), focus on facts and details versus intuition, in-
ternal versus external locus of control (Bryant et al., 
2009), and receptiveness of ambiguous information 
(Pincus, 1990; Gul, 1984). Also personality traits such 
as risk tolerance, integrity, moral development, over-
confidence, and level of professional scepticism are 
likely to feed into audit style differences at the indi-
vidual level (Knechel et al., 2015; Quadackers, Groot & 
Wright, 2014; Gul, 1984). In a Dutch context, research 
by Vaassen, Baker, and Hayes (1993) indicates that 
there are differences in cognitive styles between indi-
vidual auditors, and that firms tend to hire auditors 
whose cognitive style is aligned with the structured-
ness of the firm’s audit approach (i.e. audit style at the 
firm level). On the whole, the results of studies in this 
research area suggest that personality and cognitive 
styles are important factors in differentiating the be-
haviour of individual auditors, their audit style, and 
potentially audit quality.
2.5 Contextual factors that influence audit styles
In addition to the drivers of audit styles at the various 
levels as described above, the development of individual 
audit styles is likely to be influenced by contextual fac-
tors, such as client type, regulatory enforcement or the 
nature of accounting rules (e.g., principles-based versus 
rules-based). Indeed, future research on audit styles 
should consider potential moderating factors that in-
fluence audit styles, because financial auditing is in na-
ture characterised by interactions between the auditor 
and several stakeholders (e.g., clients and regulatory in-
spectors) (Trotman, Bauer & Humphreys, 2015; Nelson 
& Tan, 2005). At the regulatory level, audit styles are 
likely to be influenced by the way external regulators ex-
ercise power in their oversight of audit firms. Although 
external oversight is a factor outside the audit engage-
ment, the auditor’s perception about the intensity and 
strictness of regulatory oversight is likely to affect audi-
tor behaviour. In this respect, recent research by Dowl-
ing, Knechel, and Moroney (2015) emphasizes the im-
portance of a regulator’s enforcement style as a 
determinant of how audit firms manage inspection risk 
(see also discussion by Van Buuren & Wong, this issue). 
Their findings show that audit partners generally per-
ceive the regulator’s enforcement style as coercive (i.e., 
formalistic) rather than collaborative (i.e., facilitative). 
As an unintended consequence, audit firms tend to in-
crease the visibility of compliance (i.e., form over sub-
stance, documentation stylization), potentially reduc-
ing audit quality (Dowling et al., 2015). Thus, the 
regulator’s enforcement style has an influence on the 
way audits are conducted (i.e., the audit process), indi-
cating the need to consider its effects when examining 
audit styles.
Further, the nature of accounting rules and the extent 
to which these are “rules-based” versus “principles-
based” may also have an effect on the extent to which 
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individual audit styles develop and translate into spe-
cific financial statement outcomes. Therefore, it would 
be interesting to study audit styles in an internation-
al context and relate observed audit style effects to dif-
ferences in accounting standards as well as regulatory 
enforcement. This would shed more light on the ex-
tent to which these contextual factors stimulate or 
hamper the development of audit styles at the various 
levels (firm, office, team, and individual auditor).    
3 Opening the black box of audit styles
Opening the black box of different audit styles and in-
creasing our understanding of the factors that influ-
ence audit styles (and hence the audit process and au-
dit quality) is important for auditing practice. 
Specifically, considering the demand side, clients may 
use their understanding of various audit styles when 
selecting the audit firm and office that best fits their 
needs and preferences. From the perspective of the sup-
ply side, audit firms may use these new insights into 
various audit styles when composing audit teams and 
deciding on team-client combinations that decrease 
audit risk and safeguard audit quality. Making audit 
styles observable and transparent also creates oppor-
tunities for audit firms to invest in or reward certain 
behaviours and traits that are consistent with their 
firm’s culture, philosophy, and strategy (i.e., styles at 
the firm and office level). This would also promote 
more efficient self-selection of professionals into the 
various audit firms (i.e., individual level). Overall, fur-
ther knowledge on audit styles and its potential mech-
anisms to mitigate adverse effects is important for the 
audit profession to enhance audit quality.
Of course, opening the black box of audit styles and 
their effects on the audit process and audit quality 
would require an intense collaboration between the 
auditing profession and academia. The initiative of the 
Dutch audit firms, organized in the FAR, has the po-
tential to enable researchers to gain unique under-
standing of the auditing profession since one of its 
missions is to facilitate data collection for projects that 
require proprietary data from audit firms. Until now, 
most auditing research was restricted to publicly avail-
able resources, which limited the possibilities of archi-
val research to focus on the specificities of audit inputs 
and processes and the effects on audit quality (Kne-
chel et al., 2015, 2013). In this section, we provide our 
thoughts on how audit firms can assist in opening the 
black box of audit styles and their effects on the audit 
process and audit quality. 
Specifically, in order to gain insight into the various fac-
tors that shape audit styles at the firm, office, team, and 
individual level, academics need access to “inside” audit 
information (e.g., audit working papers) and insiders 
(e.g., by interviews, surveys, experiments). Interviews 
with practitioners may be helpful in exploring the dif-
ferent styles auditors use in current practice and the dif-
ferent factors that play a role in “shaping” these audit 
styles. In these interviews, researchers should not only 
focus on the individual auditor, but also on factors at 
the audit team, office, and firm level. As explained, it is 
also important to consider contextual factors at the cli-
ent and regulatory level. Based on the outcomes of such 
exploratory research, further research may engage in 
more detailed mapping and defining of auditors’ differ-
ent styles, for example by administering surveys to au-
dit staff in different levels, teams, and firms. These ques-
tionnaires may focus on the different ingredients or 
factors that potentially drive audit styles.
Close collaboration with audit firms would not only al-
low academics to shed more light on the factors that 
shape audit styles and their effects on the audit process 
and audit quality, it would also allow researchers to re-
fine and expand their measures of audit quality. Indeed, 
most studies focusing on audit quality use publicly 
available audit output measures to assess audit quality, 
such as restatements, going-concern opinions, and ab-
normal (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). However, there are 
important limitations associated with these audit qual-
ity proxies, such as high measurement error (i.e,. abnor-
mal accruals), applicability to financially distressed cli-
ents only (i.e., going-concern opinions) or infrequent 
occurrence (i.e., restatements and going-concern opin-
ions) (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Van Raak & Thürheimer, 
this issue). Therefore, access to proprietary data is de-
sirable, such as internal quality review findings, partner 
performance evaluations, violations of independence 
requirements, adjusted/unadjusted audit differences, 
and pre-audited earnings. Furthermore, access to firm 
personnel is beneficial for conducting interviews and 
administering surveys. This would allow researchers to 
gain much deeper insight into the drivers and root caus-
es of audit quality and potential control mechanisms 
firms can use to enhance audit quality. 
4 Conclusion
The research of FPW addresses an interesting and inno-
vative research question and is the first to show that fi-
nancial statement comparability is affected by unique 
“style” differences between audit firms. Although FPW 
provide some insights into the potential drivers of au-
dit styles, many questions remain unanswered. We pro-
pose extending this research from the audit firm and of-
fice level to the audit team and individual level in order 
to unravel the multitude of factors that shape audit 
styles. Following our analogy with Belgian beers, we call 
for further research into the various ingredients (indi-
vidual auditor and firm/office characteristics, team com-
position), processes (firm and office-specific methodol-
ogies and working rules) and circumstances (accounting 
standards and regulatory enforcement) that lead to spe-
cific flavours, types, and styles. 
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An increased understanding of the factors that joint-
ly influence audit styles and their effects on the au-
dit process and audit quality is important as it 
might assist audit firms in optimizing client-firm 
matching, audit team compositions, and the firm’s 
hiring, performance appraisal, and promotion deci-
sions. We believe that the initiative of the Dutch au-
dit firms organized in the FAR is instrumental and 
promising in allowing researchers to gain a unique 
insight in the auditing profession and to increase 
our understanding of the factors that influence au-
dit outcomes and hence audit quality. But let’s take 
a beer first. Cheers!  
SPECIAL ISSUE
References
 ■ Aobdia, D., Lin, C., & Petacchi, R. (2015). 
Capital market consequences of audit partner 
quality. The Accounting Review, 90(6): 2143-
2176.
 ■ Bernardi, R. (1994). Fraud detection: The ef-
fect of client integrity and competence and 
auditor cognitive style. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory, 13(Supplement): 68-84.
 ■ Bik, O., & Hooghiemstra, R. (2016). The effect 
of national culture on auditor-in-charge in-
volvement. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory, forthcoming.
 ■ Bonner, S. (2008). Judgment and decision 
making in accounting. Upper Saddle River, 
New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc.
 ■ Brown, H., & Wright, A. (2008). Negotiation 
research in auditing. Accounting Horizons, 
22(1): 91-109.
 ■ Bryant, S., Murthy, U., & Wheeler, P. (2009). 
The effects of cognitive style and feedback 
type on performance in an internal control 
task. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 
21(1): 37-58.
 ■ Burke, C., Stagl, K., Klein, C., Goodwin, G., 
Salas, E., & Halpin, S. (2006). What type of 
leadership behaviors are functional in teams? 
A meta-analysis. The Leadership Quarterly, 
17(3): 288-307.
 ■ Causholli, M., & Knechel, W. (2012). An exam-
ination of the credence attributes of an audit. 
Accounting Horizons, 26(4): 631-656.
 ■ Chen, S., Sun, S., & Wu, D. (2010). Client 
importance, institutional improvements, and 
audit quality in China: An ofﬁce and individual 
auditor level analysis. The Accounting Review, 
85(1): 127-158.
 ■ DeFond, M., & Zhang, J. (2014). A review of 
archival auditing research. Journal of Ac-
counting and Economics, 58(2-3): 275-326.
 ■ Dowling, C., Knechel, W., & Moroney, R. 
(2015). Public oversight of audit firms: The 
slippery-slope of enforcing regulation. Work-
ing paper, Monash University. Retrieved from 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2678828.
 ■ Financial Reporting Council (FRC). (2008). The 
Audit Quality Framework. London: FRC. Re-
trieved from https://frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Pub-
lications/FRC-Board/The-Audit-Quality-
Framework-(1)-File.pdf.
 ■ Francis, J., Pinnuck, M., & Watanabe, O. 
(2014). Auditor style and financial statement 
comparability. The Accounting Review, 89(2): 
605-633.
 ■ Fu, H., Tan, H.-T., & Zhang, J. (2011). Effect of 
auditor negotiation experience and client ne-
gotiating style on auditors’ judgments in an 
auditor-client negotiation context. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory, 30(3): 225-237.
 ■ Fuller, L., & Kaplan, S. (2004). A note about 
the effect of auditor cognitive style on task 
performance. Behavioral Research in Ac-
counting, 16(1): 131-143.
 ■ Gibbins, M., & Trotman, K. (2002). Audit re-
view: Managers’ interpersonal expectations 
and conduct of the review. Contemporary Ac-
counting Research, 19(3): 411-444.
 ■ Gold, A., Gronewold, U., & Salterio, S. (2014). 
Error management in audit firms: Error cli-
mate, type, and originator. The Accounting 
Review, 89(1): 303-330.
 ■ Gul, F. (1984). The joint and moderating role 
of personality and cognitive style on decision 
making. The Accounting Review, 59(2): 264-
277.
 ■ Gul, F., Wu, D., & Yang, Z. (2013). Do individu-
al auditors affect audit quality? Evidence from 
archival data. The Accounting Review, 88(6): 
1993-2023.
 ■ Hardies, K., Breesch, D., & Branson, J. (2016). 
Do (fe)male auditors impair audit quality? Evi-
dence from going-concern opinions. European 
Accounting Review, 25(1): 7-34.
 ■ Hatfield, R., Agoglia, C., & Sanchez, M. 
(2008). Client characteristics and the negotia-
tion tactics of auditors: Implications for finan-
cial reporting. Journal of Accounting Re-
search, 46(5): 1183-1207.
 ■ Hay, D., Knechel, W., & Willekens, M. (2014). 
The future of auditing research. In D. Hay, W. 
Knechel, & M. Willekens, The Routledge Com-
panion to Auditing (pp. 351-357). Abingdon: 
Routledge.
 ■ International Auditing and Assurance Stand-
ards Board (IAASB). (2015). Auditor Reporting. 
Key Audit Matters. New York: IFAC. Retrieved 
from https://www.ifac.org/publications-re-
sources/auditor-reporting-key-audit-matters.
 ■ Jenkins, J., Deis, D., Bedard, J., & Curtis, M. 
(2008). Accounting firm culture and govern-
ance: A research synthesis. Behavioral Re-
search in Accounting, 20(1): 45-74.
 ■ Kawada, B. (2014). Auditor offices and the 
comparability and quality of clients’ earnings. 
Working paper, San Diego State University. 
Retrieved from SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2510186.
 ■ Kelley, T., & Margheim, L. (1990). The impact 
of time budget pressure, personality, and 
leadership variables on dysfunctional auditor 
behavior. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory, 9(2): 21-42.
 ■ Knechel, W., Krishnan, G., Pevzner, M., Shef-
chik, L., & Velury, U. (2013). Audit quality: 
Insights from the academic literature. Audit-
ing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 32(Sup-
plement 1): 385-421.
 ■ Knechel, W., Vanstraelen, A., & Zerni, M. 
Dr. L.M.L. (Liesbeth) Bruynseels is an associate professor 
of Accounting at KU Leuven. Her research interests are 
corporate governance, auditor judgement and decision 
making, determinants of audit quality, and financial re-
porting quality.
H.M. (Herman) van Brenk MSc RA is a PhD student in Au-
diting & Assurance at Nyenrode Business University. His 
research has a behavioural focus and relates to compen-
sation incentives, personality traits, auditor judgement 
and decision making, and audit quality indicators.
We thank the editors for their comments and suggestions.
    MAB 90(9)SEPTEMBER 2016      347
(2015). Does the identity of the engagement 
partners matter? An analysis of audit partner 
reporting decisions. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 32(4): 1443-1478.
 ■ Libby, R., & Luft, J. (1993). Determinants of 
judgment performance in accounting settings: 
Ability, knowledge, motivation and environ-
ment. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
18(5): 425-450.
 ■ Morgeson, F., DeRue, D., & Karam, E. (2010). 
Leadership in teams: A functional approach to 
understanding leadership structures and pro-
cesses. Journal of Management, 36(1): 5-39.
 ■ Nelson, M., & Tan, H.-T. (2005). Judgment 
and decision making research in auditing: A 
task, person, and interpersonal interaction 
perspective. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory, 24(Supplement): 41-71.
 ■ Otley, D., & Pierce, B. (1996). The operation of 
control systems in large audit firms. Auditing: 
A Journal of Practice & Theory, 15(2): 65-84.
 ■ Pierce, B., & Sweeney, B. (2005). Manage-
ment control in audit firms - Partners’ per-
spectives. Management Accounting Research, 
16(3): 340-370.
 ■ Pincus, K. (1990). Auditor individual differenc-
es and fairness of presentation judgments. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 9(3): 
150-166.
 ■ Quadackers, L., Groot, T., & Wright, A. (2014). 
Auditors’ professional skepticism: Neutrality 
versus presumptive doubt. Contemporary Ac-
counting Research, 31(3): 639-657.
 ■ Rich, J., Solomon, I., & Trotman, K. (1997). 
The audit review process: A characterization 
from the persuasion perspective. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 22(5): 481-505.
 ■ Sweeney, B., Arnold, D., & Pierce, B. (2010). The 
impact of perceived ethical culture of the firm 
and demographic variables on auditors’ ethical 
evaluation and intention to act decisions. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 93(4): 531-551.
 ■ Trotman, K., Bauer, T., & Humphreys, K. 
(2015). Group judgment and decision making 
in auditing: Past and future research. Ac-
counting, Organizations and Society, 47, 56-
72.
 ■ Vaassen, E., Baker, C., & Hayes, R. (1993). 
Cognitive styles of experienced auditors in the 
Netherlands. The British Accounting Review, 
25(4): 367-382.
 ■ Wallman, S. (1996). The future of accounting, 
part III: Reliability and auditor independence. 
Accounting Horizons, 10(4): 76-97.
 ■ Wikipedia. (n.d.). Beer style. Retrieved May 3, 
2015, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Beer_style.
348     MAB 90(9)SEPTEMBER 2016
SPECIAL ISSUE
A discussion of “Auditor-client  
co-production of the audit and the 
effect on production efficiency”
Sytse Duiverman and Christine Nolder
SUMMARY  This article provides a reflection on the paper and presentation during the 
FAR Conference of 9 and 10 May 2016 of “Auditor-client co-production of the audit 
and the effect on production efficiency” by Gaeremynck, Willekens, and Knechel 
(GWK). The authors examine the effect of auditor-client co-production on the efficiency 
of an audit, a topic relevant to the whole audit-client financial reporting and assurance 
supply chain.  Using a sample of working papers from a Belgium Big 4 firm, the au-
thors explore the controllable (i.e., managerial) and non-controllable (i.e., environmen-
tal) factors that contribute to variations in audit efficiency within the auditor-client co-
production of financial reporting quality.  The results suggest that partner tenure 
positively contributes to the efficiency of the audit engagement, but the audit work 
prepared by the client, interim-work by the auditor, and the final audit work performed 
during off-peak season negatively affect audit efficiency. While this may be surprising 
from an efficiency standpoint, it may be that such measures add to the audit effective-
ness to an extent that outweighs any efficiency loss.  Audit quality or audit production, 
after all, is a matter of efficiency and effectiveness. GWK offer a number of important 
insights for practitioners interested in the delicate balance of managing efficiency and 
effectiveness. In the paragraphs that follow, we aim to both summarize the GWK re-
search and highlight the importance of the findings to practice.
PRACTICAL RELEVANCE  GWK lay the foundation for future advancements in audit 
efficiency research in a number of ways. Academics and practitioners can work to-
gether to refine the audit efficiency model to include additional variables (e.g., num-
ber of subjective accounts, number of critical accounting policies, senior/manager 
tenure) that significantly affect audit efficiency. When inefficient audits are identified 
both within a firm office (e.g., Boston office) and across offices around the globe, the 
model can inform managing partners at both the local and global level about poten-
tial root causes of engagement inefficiencies. Moreover, academics can work with 
practitioners to develop audit efficiency models on an account level basis to identify 
when too much time is being spent on low risk areas. Future research opportunities 
include extending the model to identify audits that are perhaps, too efficient. For ex-
ample, overly efficient audits may represent a red flag that a particular audit team 
may be cutting corners and not adhering to firm methodology.
1 Introduction and background  
What do we know about the production process of the 
audit? Production is the process of converting a set of 
inputs into a set of outputs that have economic value 
(Shepherd, 1970).  Production efficiency is generally 
defined in terms of minimizing the inputs to a produc-
tion process for a given level of output (Fried et al., 
2002). Up until now, only a few studies have examined 
audit production efficiency, in part, because of a lack 
of accessible data from firms (Causholli, De Martinis, 
Hay & Knechel, 2010). Despite this limitation, a scarce 
number of studies on audit production have provided 
valuable insights regarding the efficiency of the audit 
process.
Dopuch et al. (2003) use Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA)1 and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to esti-
mate audit efficiency. Both of these techniques are 
benchmark techniques which compare individual au-
dits to an “efficient frontier”. The most efficient audit 
is deemed a 100% efficient audit, all other audits are 
considered to be inefficient, meaning that they could 
potentially reach the same output using fewer audit 
hours. Dopuch et al. (2003) use client characteristics 
as inputs and audit hours as outputs in their DEA ap-
proach. In doing so, they assume the output of the au-
dit process (i.e., assurance) to be constant when in 
practice, reasonable assurance may vary across audits. 
Dopuch et  al. (2003) find that audit efficiency has 
room for improvement, and inefficiencies are costly. 
However, many of the client characteristics in the mod-
el are not controllable and therefore, cannot be man-
aged by audit firms to improve efficiency.  As such, 
Dopuch et al. (2003) increased the level of interest in 
the examination of auditor-client co-production.
Knechel et al. (2009) extend this line of research by let-
ting go of the “fixed level of assurance” assumption to 
accommodate the variation in reasonable assurance 
across audits.  Like Dopuch et al. (2003), they utilize 
DEA to measure audit production efficiency. However, 
the inputs and outputs used by Knechel et al. (2009) are 
different. Audit costs per staff level are used as the in-
puts of the production function. The number of hours 
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spent on assurance increasing activities (such as audit 
planning, internal control evaluation and substantive 
testing) are used as an output measure since these ac-
tivities would presumably lead to a higher level of assur-
ance. Knechel et al. (2009) find that audits are more ef-
ficient for (1) larger clients, (2) clients with a December 
year-end and (3) clients who are more automated. Au-
dits are less efficient when auditors (1) rely on internal 
controls, (2) provide non-audit services and (3) when cli-
ents have subsidiaries. However, after the publication of 
Knechel et al. (2009) it was still unclear to what extent 
firms could control variations in audit efficiency.
2  Summary of  Gaeremynck, Willekens and Kne-
chel (2016)
In practice, it is generally assumed that more intensive 
client co-operation leads to more efficient audits. GWK 
seek to assess how the joint decisions (e.g., reliance on 
internal audit or the timing of the audit work) made 
by the auditor and client influence the efficiency of au-
dit engagements. They begin by suggesting that differ-
ent audit approaches yield different levels of assurance 
even though the final output for each audit is unitary 
(i.e., audit opinion). That is, the audit approach is 
based on the professional judgement of the auditor 
and is reflected in the risk assessment, the level of ma-
teriality, and the extensiveness of the planned audit 
procedures. 
Unlike previous studies, GWK measure the variation 
in assurance by using the engagement’s final material-
ity level. They explain that because lower materiality 
requires more extensive audit work, one can assume 
that different levels of materiality lead to relatively dif-
ferent levels of assurance (assuming all else equal). 
Therefore, GWK use materiality as their output meas-
ure (i.e., dependent variable) for measuring the efficien-
cy of the audit process. 
In general, the audit process is a complex service which 
is highly dependent on the unique characteristics of 
both the client and the auditor. Inefficiencies in the 
audit process may stem from auditors’ choices in the 
production process and client specific characteristics. 
GWK develop a model to disentangle the controllable 
factors from the non-controllable client specific fac-
tors. This distinction is important to elucidate poten-
tial strategies for improving the efficiency of audits. 
The study was conducted on 158 diverse audit engage-
ments for the year ends 2006 or 2007. GWK’s data in-
cludes publically available client data and data from a 
Belgium Big 4 audit firm (i.e., audit team information, 
client information, hours performed per staff level, 
deadline information, engagement specific informa-
tion and deliverables). 
To disentangle managerial from non-controllable ef-
ficiency, GWK’s model includes a three-stage DEA ana-
lysis to determine the level of managerial and non-con-
trollable efficiency: 
Stage 1: DEA-analysis with fundamental inputs (labor) 
and outputs (materiality) to determine preliminary ef-
ficiency. 
Stage 2: Apply DEA to inefficiencies (slack) of stage 1 
and environmental factors to isolate environmental or 
non-controllable inefficiencies.
Stage 3: Apply DEA to fundamental inputs and out-
puts after adjusting for environmental factors isolat-
ed in step 2 to assess managerial or controllable inef-
ficiencies.
The estimated managerial and non-controllable inef-
ficiencies were thereafter incorporated in a regression 
analysis to determine which aspects of the auditor-cli-
ent co-production are associated with more or less 
managerial controllable inefficiency. Variables in the 
regression include controllable characteristics of an 
audit such as composition of the audit team, partner 
tenure, manager tenure, substantive testing before year 
end, interim audit, audit report lag, internal audit ben-
efit and auditor’s use of work prepared by the client.2
GWK found that partner tenure positively contributes 
to audit efficiency, but that preparation of the audit 
work done by the client, interim work and final audit 
work done during off-peak season negatively affects 
efficiency. The evidence for a negative relationship be-
tween interim-work and preparations made by the cli-
ent are surprising because they contradict the assump-
tion that these factors contribute to audit efficiency. 
Furthermore, contrary to expectations, the results sug-
gest that no efficiencies are realized by relying on the 
client’s internal audit department, providing non-au-
dit services to the client, and having a higher qualified 
audit team. The authors do not hypothesize about the 
reasons for the unexpected findings. However, with re-
spect to the internal audit department, it is possible 
that client delays in deliverables disrupt the schedul-
ing of the field work and thus, affect the efficiency of 
the engagement.    
3  Recommendations, implications, and consider-
ations for science and practice
3.1 Audience
In the current version of the paper, it is unclear which 
audience (e.g. academics, practitioners, regulators) is 
being targeted and who are the primary beneficiaries 
of the research. Statements in both the introduction 
and conclusion suggest that academics are the target 
audience since the research challenges the assumptions 
underlying traditional techniques for analyzing pro-
duction efficiency used by academics.  That is, GWK’s 
research does not assume assurance is fixed and pro-
poses materiality levels as a new proxy for the output 
measure in audit efficiency models studied and tested 
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by academics.  Moreover, the authors appeal to aca-
demics by introducing a new approach to measuring 
audit efficiency using their three-stage process.
Besides academics, it stands to reason that practition-
ers have the most to gain from scientific advances in 
audit efficiency (and effectiveness) research. That is, 
improving our understanding of how firms can meas-
ure, monitor, and thus, manage audit efficiency with-
in and across firms are of great importance to practi-
tioners. In the next section, we further elaborate on the 
significant contribution of audit efficiency research to 
practitioners.
3.2 Importance
The importance of the research is currently described 
in terms of demonstrating how to separate out the 
controllable (i.e., managerial) factors from the uncon-
trollable (i.e., environmental) factors so that firms can 
focus on what is in their control.  Based on the fram-
ing and the tone of the writing, readers may infer that 
the uncontrollable factors are not informative and 
thus, can be set aside to focus on what is controllable. 
However, isolating the relationship between the un-
controllable factors and audit efficiency is of signific-
ant value to firms. That is, knowing how to measure 
the uncontrollable factors and their relationship with 
the number and mix of audit hours within and across 
offices has the potential to significantly improve the 
firm’s operations. Currently, firms have systematic 
models (or at the very least, benchmarks) for how many 
hours and what mix of rank hours are necessary based 
on client factors such as size, risks, complexity, con-
trols, etc.  Firms can benefit from audit efficiency re-
search by measuring the actual hours and mix for each 
audit and comparing the efficiency scores of each to 
determine the extent to which audits appear to be im-
properly staffed when controlling for managerial fac-
tors. As such, GWK’s research disentangling the con-
trollable and uncontrollable factors has the potential 
of benefiting practice to a much greater extent than 
presently described.
3.3 Contribution/implications
The contribution/implications of this research extends 
beyond the newly introduced statistical approach sug-
gested by the authors. The research offers a means for 
examining the relationship between audit efficiency 
and audit quality. To illustrate, imagine a firm that cal-
culates the audit efficiency scores for all audits inspect-
ed by regulators each year.  Over time, the firm can 
identify a relationship between audit efficiency and au-
dit quality.  The firm can then calculate the audit effi-
ciency scores for all audits and preemptively identify 
the audits that have a greater likelihood of containing 
audit deficiencies. Further investigation may reveal 
these audits may be indicative of cultural differences 
across offices or perhaps training issues in one or more 
locations.  As such, the identified audits may warrant 
remediation such as greater supervision or an alterna-
tive mix of staffing. 
4 Conclusion
In short, GWK add to our understanding of the driv-
ers and impediments of audit efficiency. Moreover, 
their model provides a means for isolating uncontrol-
lable client factors, which may lead to strategies for 
monitoring and managing engagement compliance 
with firm methodology. Such advancements may lead 
to measured improvements in the standardization of 
audit quality within global network firms. In conclu-
sion, GWK exemplify the advantages of a close coop-
eration between researchers and practitioners and how 
such cooperation can lead to new insights that will 
move relevant audit research forward.  
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were purposely not included in the regression but 
include measures such as size, industry, and 
financial risk.
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1 Introduction
The ability to correctly assess and measure audit qual-
ity is of importance to audit firms, users of financial 
statements, regulators, standard-setters and society at 
large. This is reflected in various recent initiatives on 
audit quality indicators by regulators and oversight 
bodies (IAASB, 2014; CAQ, 2014; PCAOB, 2015), and 
changes to the auditor report (ISA 701). Academic re-
search has contributed to the discussion about audit 
quality, largely relying on publicly available data to 
measure and infer audit quality. However, these pub-
licly available measures of audit quality may not cap-
ture actual audit quality. In fact, commonly used audit 
quality proxies in audit research are not associated with 
alleged audit deficiencies in investigations by the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and class-ac-
tion lawsuits against auditors which reflect how ex-
ternal stakeholders assess audit performance. Extant 
proxies of audit quality may thus not adequately reflect 
audit quality. This is the key message of Professor Suraj 
Srinivasan’s talk at the Foundation for Auditing Re-
search conference which took place on May 9 and 10, 
2016 at Nyenrode Business University. Suraj Srinivasan 
is a professor of Accounting and Management at Har-
vard Business School. His presentation was based on 
his working paper titled “Measuring Audit Quality”, 
which is joint work with Shivaram Rajgopal (Professor 
of Accounting and Auditing at Columbia Business 
School) and Xin Zheng (doctoral student at Emory 
University).
The purpose of this paper is twofold. We first shed some 
light on the current body of academic knowledge on the 
measurement of audit quality by discussing the study 
of Rajgopal, Srinivasan & Zheng (2015) (hereafter RSZ). 
Building on this, we elaborate on how a collaboration 
between practice and academia can improve the meas-
urement of audit quality and thus allow researchers to 
assist practice in enhancing and safeguarding audit 
quality. Specifically, we point to the necessity for re-
searchers to gain access to engagement-specific, granu-
lar audit data in order to make practically relevant rec-
ommendations for the audit profession and work 
towards a joint goal of high audit quality.
Opportunities to improve the 
measurement of audit quality:
a call for collaboration between 
the profession and academics
Jeroen van Raak and  Ulrike Thürheimer
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SUMMARY  Audit research relies on a wide range of publicly available measures to 
examine which factors influence the quality of financial statement audits. While re-
search to date has to rely largely on remote proxies due to a lack of access to pro-
prietary data, there is considerable doubt about the validity of these proxies and the 
inferences drawn based on these proxies. In order to provide insight into the reliabil-
ity of these measures, Rajgopal, Srinivasan & Zheng (2015) investigate whether 
commonly used proxies for audit quality (i.e. auditor size, abnormal audit fees, ac-
crual quality, and the propensity to meet and beat analyst targets) are associated 
with deficiencies reported in SEC investigations and class-action lawsuits. Such al-
leged deficiencies reflect how external stakeholders assess audit performance. Their 
study indicates that the use of such proxies is highly problematic and that the per-
formance of these measures, with the exception of auditor size, is poor. 
PRACTICAL RELEVANCE  This paper discusses the study by Rajgopal et al. (2015) 
and provides implications for research and practice. Specifically, we argue that fail-
ure to reliably measure audit quality harms the capability of academic researchers 
to assist the auditing profession in safeguarding and enhancing audit quality. Access 
to proprietary engagement data is thus essential for researchers to examine the key 
drivers of audit quality and to propose practically relevant recommendations.
    MAB 90(9)SEPTEMBER 2016      353
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
The next section describes how audit quality is defined 
and how extant research has measured audit quality 
using publicly available data. Section 3 provides a sum-
mary of the study by RSZ. Section 4 discusses the con-
tributions and limitations of RSZ. The paper con-
cludes with a discussion on how measurement of audit 
quality can be improved through a collaboration be-
tween practice and research.
2 Defining and measuring audit quality
It is difficult to define what encompasses audit quali-
ty as perceptions of audit quality vary across stakehold-
er groups (see e.g. Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shef-
chik & Velury, 2013). Investors and society at large may 
consider audits to be of high quality if the financial 
statements are free from material misstatements and 
expect auditors to provide a warning signal in case of 
a client’s impending bankruptcy, in the form of a go-
ing concern opinion (Carson et al., 2013). Regulators 
and oversight bodies might instead consider audits as 
high quality if they have been conducted and docu-
mented in line with auditing standards and if auditors 
obtained sufficient competent audit evidence to sup-
port their audit opinion (GAO, 2003). Finally, audit 
professionals may deem audits to be of high quality if 
risks have been sufficiently considered and incorpor-
ated into an effective audit plan, and if the audit has 
been performed according to the audit plan and audit 
auditing standards (see e.g. Christensen, Glover, Omer 
& Shelley, 2015 and PwC, 2015).
Prior academic literature has provided various defini-
tions of audit quality. The most frequently cited defi-
nition of audit quality is the one by DeAngelo (1981). 
She defines audit quality as “the market-assessed joint 
probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a 
breach in the client’s accounting system, and (b) report 
the breach” (p. 186). Hence, audit quality can be seen 
as a function of an auditor’s perceived competence and 
independence (Watts & Zimmerman 1981). DeAnge-
lo’s (1981) audit quality definition essentially charac-
terizes audit quality as dichotomous, i.e. failure or non-
failure to detect and report violations. The definition 
does not reflect the fact that audit quality can be de-
fined as a continuum ranging from low to high (Fran-
cis, 2004, 2011). Taking this into account, DeFond and 
Zhang (2014, p. 276) define higher audit quality as 
“greater assurance that the financial statements faith-
fully reflect the firm’s underlying economics, condi-
tioned on its financial reporting system and innate 
characteristics”. This definition of audit quality is re-
lated to clients’ financial reporting quality and reflects 
a regulatory view of audit quality that higher audit 
quality is necessarily better (Donovan et al., 2014). Do-
novan et al. (2014), in their discussion of DeFond and 
Zhang (2014), however, suggest a more client/auditor-
centric view with audit quality being determined by cli-
ent preferences and audit firm’s efficient provision of 
services for which they hold a competitive advantage. 
Thus, Donovan et al. (2014) propose that auditors’ 
competitive advantages and institutional features of 
the audit process should be integrated in the defini-
tion of audit quality. Overall, a multitude of defini-
tions of audit quality exist, and none may be complete, 
partly because different stakeholders hold different 
opinions about what encompasses audit quality. 
While audit quality is difficult to define and no uni-
versally accepted definition exists, it is even more chal-
lenging to measure audit quality reliably. Audits are la-
bor intensive and require a lot of judgment, while the 
outcome of the audit (i.e. the level of assurance over fi-
nancial statements) is not directly observable. Hence, 
a financial statement audit can be classified as a cre-
dence good1 (Causholli & Knechel, 2012). In fact, au-
dit failures might not be revealed until years after an 
audit has taken place, or not at all.
The measurement of audit quality is further compli-
cated by the fact that audit researchers and external 
stakeholders typically need to rely on publicly availa-
ble information. Therefore, audit research uses various 
alternative, but sometimes distant and indirect prox-
ies for audit quality. The most commonly used prox-
ies for audit quality are a Big N indicator (assuming 
higher audit quality if an audit is conducted by one of 
the larger audit firms), discretionary accruals (i.e. the 
part of accruals which are assumed to be used by man-
agement for earnings management purposes), the pro-
pensity to issue a going concern opinion, (abnormal) 
audit fees, meeting or beating analyst forecasts, restate-
ments, accounting conservatism, auditor litigation, 
and perception-based measures, such as PCAOB in-
spections, cost of capital, and the earnings response 
coefficient as a means of analyzing market reactions 
to unexpected earnings (see DeFond & Zhang, 2014, 
for a comprehensive list). It goes without saying that, 
taken at face value, these publicly available measures 
of audit quality are at best indirect and seem discon-
nected from audit practice. Since researchers without 
access to better data must measure audit quality in 
such an indirect way, large measurement error may re-
sult and some measures may reflect client effects rath-
er than auditor effects (e.g. discretionary accruals like-
ly reflect within-GAAP earnings management which is 
to a large extent at the discretion of management). 
Clearly, these measures suffer from limitations. Test-
ing the reliability of these measures is at the heart of 
RSZ’s analysis and these issues are further detailed be-
low.
Researchers examine the association between these au-
dit input or outcome proxies of audit quality and un-
derlying audit characteristics or contextual factors to 
examine a wide variety of research questions. The audit-
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ing literature for example examines how audit quality 
is affected by factors such as: auditor independence (e.g. 
DeFond, Raghunandan & Subramanyam, 2002), indus-
try expertise (e.g. Reichelt & Wang 2010), auditor ten-
ure (e.g. Myers, Myers & Omer, 2003), mandatory or vol-
untary firm and partner rotation (e.g. Lennox, Wu & 
Zhang 2014), fee pressure (e.g. Choi, Kim & Zang, 2010), 
office size (e.g. Choi, Kim, Kim & Zang 2010), voluntary 
audits (e.g. Lennox & Pittman, 2011), and joint audits 
(e.g. Zerni, Haapamäki, Järvinen & Niemi, 2012). How-
ever, prior research finds only limited or mixed evidence 
for many of these research questions which curbs the 
potential for practically relevant recommendations for 
audit practice and standard-setting.
This point is illustrated by the diverging findings on 
whether high (abnormal) audit fees, an input to the 
audit, enhance or reduce audit quality, and whether 
fees serve as a direct proxy of audit or financial report-
ing quality. High fees can be attributed to a) econom-
ic bonding between the client and the auditor which 
would reduce audit quality, b) a risk premium paid by 
the client, or low audit efficiency which would not im-
pact audit quality, or c) high audit effort which would 
increase audit quality (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). An-
other complicating factor is the fact that audit fees are 
an input to the audit, but that (abnormal) audit fees 
are used as proxies for both audit input (i.e. risk pre-
mium, efficiency and effort explanations, see for exam-
ple Doogar, Sivadasan & Solomon, 2015) and output 
(i.e. fees as a proxy for audit quality and financial re-
porting quality, see for example Hribar, Kravet & Wil-
son, 2014). Since researchers have to rely on publicly 
available data and are thus unable to clearly distin-
guish between these alternative explanations, it is not 
surprising that various different findings are reported 
in the audit fee literature.
The mixed findings in prior audit fee literature and au-
dit research in general might thus be attributed to the 
use of imperfect measures of audit quality. These stud-
ies may at best fail to assess the real impact of audit 
characteristics or contextual factors on audit quality 
or at worst make erroneous inferences and provide in-
appropriate recommendations for audit practice and 
regulation. This clearly illustrates the need for better 
measures of audit quality for the sake of enhancing 
knowledge about audit quality and its determinants, 
and ultimately contributing to the improvement of au-
dit quality in practice. Practical recommendations on 
how audit quality can be improved may be enabled 
through access to audit firm data, thus bridging the 
current disconnect between science and practice.
3  Validity of currently used audit quality  
measures
In order to verify how well the commonly used prox-
ies for audit quality reflect actual audit failures, RSZ 
examine in their current study whether the most fre-
quently used audit quality proxies reflect alleged audit 
deficiencies in the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing En-
forcement Releases (AAERs) against auditors and class-
action lawsuits in which auditors appear as defend-
ants. The content of AAERs and lawsuits reflect how 
external stakeholders, the SEC and private law firms, 
assess audit performance on a granular level. The au-
dit deficiencies mentioned by the SEC and private law 
firms may reflect impaired reporting quality, violations 
of auditing standards, and provide a strong indication 
of poor audit quality. 
Specifically, RSZ assess whether these detailed deficien-
cies are associated with the following audit quality 
measures: Big N, discretionary accruals (the part of ac-
cruals which reflect management choices and earnings 
management), accrual quality (the extent to which ac-
cruals map into operating cash flows), (abnormal) au-
dit fees, and the likelihood of meeting or beating ana-
lyst forecasts. Using hand-collected data on 
non-dismissed class-action lawsuits and AAERs, they 
examine the extent to which the deficiencies specified 
within these documents explain variation in audit 
quality proxies. For this purpose, they collect data 
from 1978 to 2011, including 34 AAERs (87 firm-years) 
and 135 lawsuits (382 firm-years)2. A wide range of de-
ficiencies are mentioned within these documents. RSZ 
extract the following issues: lack of independence from 
the client, a failure to exercise due care, an insufficient 
level of professional skepticism, an inadequate plan-
ning and supervision, an inadequate assessment of 
fraud risks, a failure to gather sufficient audit evidence, 
a failure to express an appropriate audit opinion, and 
a failure to evaluate the adequacy of disclosures. The 
authors classify these deficiencies into a number of 
broad categories and subcategories which are in line 
with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS).
Specifically, RSZ regress each of the aforementioned 
audit quality proxies on the number of allegations 
mentioned or on specific audit deficiencies mentioned 
in the AAERs and class-action lawsuits, controlling for 
commonly defined factors. The evidence they present 
provides limited support for the reliance on measures 
of audit quality used by prior research. The authors re-
port that the total number of allegations is negatively 
associated with the presence of a Big N audit firm, 
which in turn seems to be driven by the fact that Big 
N audit firms are less likely to be accused of failure to 
exercise due care. Big N auditors are, however, not as-
sociated with any other specific audit deficiencies (i.e. 
those described in the previous paragraph). This sug-
gests that Big N as a proxy for audit quality may rea-
sonably reflect audit quality as perceived by external 
stakeholders in the US setting. The authors further-
more note that abnormal audit fees are on the one 
hand negatively associated with failure to adequately 
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plan the audit, the failure to state whether the finan-
cial statements are presented according to Generally 
Accepted Accounting Standards (GAAP), and inade-
quate considerations of fraud risks. On the other hand, 
abnormal audit fees are positively associated with the 
total number of violations and the number of other al-
legations of deficiencies. This makes it hard to inter-
pret the findings. Moreover, as explained above, the use 
of (abnormal) audit fees as an indicator of audit qual-
ity is generally speaking rather complicated, as higher 
fees can reflect more effort, but could also reflect a risk 
premium (in case of increased client risks) or even poor 
planning or economic bonding and thus impaired au-
ditor independence. Regardless of the difficulty asso-
ciated with the interpretation of the effect of audit 
pricing on audit quality, it is also a difficult measure 
to act upon (i.e. it is hard to argue that increasing/de-
creasing fees could improve audit quality). The other 
measures of audit quality, i.e. discretionary accruals, 
accrual quality and the likelihood of meeting or beat-
ing earnings targets, are not (consistently) associated 
with allegations of deficiencies. In summary, only one 
of the proxies provides a consistent (negative) associ-
ation with the number of alleged deficiencies report-
ed by the SEC and lawyers, which is audit firm size (Big 
N). RSZ therefore suggest that Big N can be used as a 
reasonable proxy for audit quality. At the same time, 
the authors urge future research to refine or develop 
new audit quality proxies, for example through access 
to better data. 
We concur with RSZ’s conclusion that refinement of 
audit quality proxies is needed, and point to at least 
four reasons why the Big N measure which is consist-
ently negatively associated with allegations in AAERs 
and lawsuits in RSZ, is not uncontested: a) auditor 
choice is endogenous and based on client characteris-
tics (see e.g. Lennox, Francis & Wang, 2012 for a dis-
cussion on selection bias); b) the measure is not en-
gagement specific, hence it is impossible to examine 
variations in audit quality across clients within the 
same auditor type3; c) it is an input, not an outcome 
variable, making it impossible to verify how differenc-
es in for example audit process factors, such as adopt-
ed audit methodologies, affect audit quality; and d) 
there is mixed support for audit quality differentiation 
of large audit firms in settings outside the US, such as 
in continental Europe (Vander Bauwhede & Willekens, 
2004). Thus, it is not sufficient to rely on the Big N 
measure as a proxy for audit quality if research is to in-
form practice and standard-setting in the future. 
4 Contributions and limitations of RSZ
RSZ make at least three important contributions to 
the auditing literature. First, by providing evidence 
which highlights the issues with commonly adopted 
proxies for audit quality, they show that these meas-
ures hardly reflect any of the deficiencies pointed out 
by the SEC or lawyers. The only proxy which RSZ rec-
ommend and which does not seem to suffer from con-
struct validity problems is auditor size (a Big N dum-
my). This paints a gloomy picture of audit research of 
the past 35 years, since it appears that audit research 
has not made significant advancements beyond the 
proposition in DeAngelo (1981) that auditor size and 
audit quality are positively associated. This is further 
problematic as it raises serious concerns with respect 
to the validity of prior research using the common au-
dit quality proxies under investigation in RSZ. This is 
evidenced by the fact that various inconsistent find-
ings on the same research questions have been pro-
duced over the years, sometimes without reaching con-
sensus4.
Secondly, the findings of RSZ add to the literature by 
providing detailed descriptions and examples of audit 
deficiencies. By classifying the deficiencies in line with 
GAAS standards RSZ provide a foundation for future 
research on this topic.
Finally, RSZ provide insights into how external stake-
holders evaluate audit deficiencies and the differences 
in focus between regulatory agencies (i.e. the SEC) and 
lawyers. For example, they show that lawyers typically 
focus on a greater number of violations, and violations 
of sub-standards. Furthermore, lawyers mostly sue the 
largest audit firms. This is in line with deep-pockets 
hypothesis.5 In contrast, most of the investigations by 
the SEC target the smaller audit firms. The SEC typi-
cally also mentions a smaller number of deficiencies. 
Potential explanations for the SEC’s behavior are that 
auditors might be too big to fail or the revolving door 
phenomenon6 (Kedia, Khan & Rajgopal, 2015).
While the study by RSZ clearly points to the limita-
tions of commonly used audit quality measures, we 
also note a number of limitations of the paper itself. 
First of all, and as acknowledged by RSZ, AAERs by the 
SEC and class-action lawsuits reflect audit deficiencies 
as perceived by external stakeholders. Whereas these 
are relatively objective and detailed measures of audit 
deficiencies, the measure might suffer from selection 
bias. While lawyers are more likely to pursue large au-
dit firms with deep pockets in class-action lawsuits, the 
SEC is less likely to go after large audit firms. This se-
lection bias might impact the results of the study, and 
little can be done to effectively control for the bias 
since selection of audit firms by the SEC and lawyers 
is based on factors unobservable to academics. 
Second, and as mentioned by RSZ, the lawsuits and 
SEC investigations in their sample are always settled 
outside of court. This makes it unclear to what extent 
an audit was actually insufficient in the sense that al-
legations would hold up in a court of law and to what 
extent a settlement relates to reputation protection by 
the auditor. We do point out that this is probably less 
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of an issue for SEC investigations as the SEC has ac-
cess to issuer data and thus better insight into any vi-
olations. However, the sample is comprised of a larger 
number of lawsuits than AAERs, which potentially af-
fects the validity of results.
Third, auditors are only sued if there is very strong ev-
idence of financial statement fraud. This implies that 
the approach used by the authors to identify audit fail-
ures might only capture the most extreme and rare cas-
es. As pointed out by Francis (2004), less than 1 per-
cent of all audits represent outright audit failures.
Fourth, we note that the majority of AAERs and class-
action lawsuits relate to the period from 1997 to 
2004, which is in line with other research which 
shows that the tendency to sue auditors has decreased 
in the period after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (see e.g. Fuerman, 2012). This may impact the 
ability of future research to assess audit quality 
through the use of deficiencies reported in lawsuits 
or AAERs. More generally, audit research in settings 
outside the US cannot rely on such deficiencies to as-
sess audit quality, since inspection reports and data 
on lawsuits are typically not publicly available out-
side of the US. 
Fifth, while we concur with the notion that currently 
used audit quality proxies are imperfect, we raise the 
question whether one would actually expect an associ-
ation between these proxies and the deficiencies report-
ed in AAERs and class-action lawsuits. For example, the 
amount of discretionary accruals (a measure of accrual 
quality) picks up within-GAAP earnings management, 
whereas the AAERs and class-action lawsuits are relat-
ed to severe audit deficiencies. Thus, the lack of signifi-
cant associations between extant audit quality measures 
and deficiencies noted in AAERs and class-action law-
suits may not completely invalidate these audit quality 
constructs. Nevertheless, we agree with the authors that 
developing new audit quality proxies or refining the ex-
isting ones through access to more granular data is par-
amount if research is to inform and assist practice in its 
ambition to improve audit quality.
As a suggestion for future research we believe that it 
could be useful to cluster the various reported deficien-
cies and focus on those deficiencies which actually im-
pair audit quality. This is important because the re-
ported deficiencies are interdependent. For example, 
the selection of an engagement team that lacks re-
quired industry specific expertise might fail to exercise 
sufficient professional skepticism, which could lead to 
an insufficient evaluation of audit evidence, which sub-
sequently can cause the auditor to issue an inappro-
priate audit opinion.
Finally, we want to point out that it could be insight-
ful for future research to examine, based on the alleged 
deficiencies, if there are specific settings in which par-
ticular traditional audit quality measures do provide 
reliable indications of audit quality (see Lennox, Wu 
& Zhang, 2016, for evidence that discretionary accru-
als and earnings characteristics reflect higher audit 
quality in the Chinese setting). More over, it is import-
ant to recognize that each measure has both advantag-
es and disadvantages (for example with regard to reli-
ability and timeliness), making it important for 
researchers to assess which proxy is best used to an-
swer a particular research question.
5 Conclusion
Academic research, using publicly available data, may 
have provided a starting point for understanding au-
dit quality and its various determinants and levels. 
However, as pointed out by RSZ, audit research large-
ly relies on publicly available, but quite imperfect 
measures of audit quality. In order to enable research-
ers to assist the auditing profession and financial state-
ment users in understanding the drivers of audit qual-
ity and the root causes of audit failures, it is of key 
importance to provide researchers with access to more 
insightful internal audit firm data and potential audit 
quality indicators (see also Francis, 2011 and Knechel 
et al., 2013). Some recent literature provides first in-
sights into audit quality using engagement-specific 
proprietary audit firm data, for example internal as-
sessments of engagement quality (Bell, Causholli & 
Knechel, 2015). Bell et al. (2015) provide additional in-
sights into the audit process and quality and shed light 
on issues for which previous literature had found 
mixed results7. These papers provide a promising start 
and show that a collaborative approach between the 
profession, regulators or oversight bodies and academ-
ics, as initiated in the Netherlands by the Foundation 
for Auditing Research, is the only way forward for ac-
ademics to truly contribute to safeguarding and en-
hancing audit quality and for practitioners to gain rel-
evant insights into factors affecting audit quality.
Since the quality of an audit depends on inputs to the 
audit, the audit process, and outputs that arise from 
the audit process (IAASB, 2014), the availability of au-
dit firm data on these input, process, and output fac-
tors, as well as client characteristics and contextual fac-
tors is the key to enhance our understanding about 
audit quality, its determinants and consequences.
Possible examples of audit output data which could 
be of use in academic research, are internal quality re-
view reports, waived misstatements, the size of re-
quired adjustments to be made by the client, and in-
spection reports to audit firms by oversight bodies 
(such as the Dutch AFM and the US PCAOB). This 
would provide researchers with more direct and accur-
ate indicators of audit quality than the currently used 
proxies and enable researchers to answer important re-
search questions that inform audit firms, regulators, 
and society at large.
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Audit research could further enhance our understand-
ing by not only providing insight into the outcomes 
of an audit, but also by providing insight into the au-
dit process, such as chosen audit techniques and meth-
odologies and the development of new tools, such as 
those related to Big Data analysis. Access to audit in-
put data, such as audit team composition, auditor 
characteristics and behavioral aspects of the audit will 
be vital for gaining an understanding of the drivers 
and root causes of audit quality. hese insights will al-
low academics to assess which resources, techniques, 
methodologies, and tools lead to the highest impact 
on audit effectiveness and efficiency across different 
clients and will help to understand the determinants 
of audit quality.
It is paramount to base audit research on internal audit 
firm and engagement-specific data to provide findings, 
unconfounded by measurement issues, on the factors 
that improve or harm audit quality. Researchers’ access 
to proprietary audit firm data promises to not only clar-
ify mixed previous findings but will also help to shed 
light on previously unexplored research questions that 
are of importance to audit firms, regulators, and users 
of financial statements. These insights can enhance our 
knowledge about audit quality, help audit firms in plan-
ning and conducting audits and decrease the expecta-
tion gap between auditors and external stakeholders. 
Ultimately, this will allow researchers to make valuable 
and practically-relevant recommendations to audit prac-
tice about how audit quality can potentially be im-
proved. There is a lot to gain from collaboration be-
tween audit firms and accounting scholars.  
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Notes
The economics literature defines a credence 
good as a good whose qualities are not observa-
ble before or after the purchase of the good and 
whose need is difficult to know ex ante. This 
makes it difficult for the buyer of the credence 
good to assess its utility (Emons, 1997). Caush-
olli and Knechel (2012) examine the audit as a 
credence good since the quality is not known by 
the client (or other stakeholders), ex ante or ex 
post. 
All lawsuits and SEC AAERs in RSZ’s sample 
are settled outside of court. 
It is also important to acknowledge that the 
Big4 are not a homogenous group and that there 
are differences in audit quality between large audit 
firms. For example, inspection reports (e.g. by the 
Dutch AFM or the PCAOB) indicate quality differ-
ences between the Big4. Furthermore, audit quali-
ty likely varies within a Big4 firm, for example, 
across audit offices (Francis & Yu, 2009).
The findings in RSZ clearly show that results 
of previous studies using these noisy audit quali-
ty proxies may not be relied upon, which is fur-
ther corroborated by the fact that studies using 
the same proxies find different results. Neverthe-
less, it is important to acknowledge that there are 
settings for which the commonly used proxies for 
audit quality form relatively consistent and logical 
results over time. 
Larger auditors with more wealth are at 
higher risk from litigation since the rewards for 
plaintiffs will be higher when targeting auditors 
with deep pockets. Dye (1993) suggests that 
large auditors thus have an incentive to issue 
more accurate reports so as to avoid the risk 
from litigation. 
The revolving doors phenomenon implies 
that the SEC is less likely to pursue large audit 
firms since the SEC’s (enforcement) staff is leni-
ent towards potential future employers such as 
the large audit firms. This suggests regulatory 
capture of the SEC (Kedia, Khan & Rajgopal, 
2015). The second potential phenomenon that 
can explain why the SEC is less likely to pursue 
large auditors is that the audit firms have be-
come too big to fail and that the audit market 
would suffer from the exit of a Big4 audit firm 
(Kedia, Khan & Rajgopal, 2015).
Bell, Causholli and Knechel (2015) investi-
gate how auditor tenure and the provision of 
non-audit services impact audit quality, meas-
ured as quality indicated through internal quality 
reviews. They show that tenure has no impact on 
audit quality for SEC registrants, but decreases 
audit quality for private clients. They further show 
that non-audit service fees are positively associ-
ated with audit quality for SEC registrants and 
negatively associated with audit quality for pri-
vate clients. This sheds light on previous mixed 
findings on whether audit quality improves or 
declines with tenure, and the provision of non-
audit services.
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1 Audit quality and supervisor enforcement styles 
1.1. Research objective
First, we will provide a summary of the paper by KDM. 
After a series of corporate accounting scandals between 
2000 and 2005, the oversight of the audit profession 
was considered insufficient and the need was identi-
fied to strengthen oversight. As a consequence, regu-
latory bodies around the world started playing a more 
active role and regulations were tightened. Among the 
implemented measures are audit firm inspections, 
through which regulators aim to improve the quality 
of public audits. The purpose of these inspections is 
to identify weaknesses and deficiencies in how an au-
dit is conducted. The findings of the investigations 
along with suggestions for improvements are then 
communicated to the audit firms through (publicly 
available) inspection reports (see FRC, 2016; PCAOB, 
2016). To examine the effectiveness of these inspec-
tions, Church and Shefchik (2011) examined the num-
ber of deficiencies found in PCAOB’s inspection re-
ports in the years 2004 to 2009 and found a decline in 
deficiencies over the years, suggesting that inspections 
indeed improve audit quality. Yet, it is also possible 
that audit firms become better in anticipating on in-
spections. To gain a better understanding of how au-
dit firms manage inspections, Knechel et al. (2016) in-
terviewed audit partners from Big 4 firms, mid-tier 
firms and regulators in Australia. More specifically, us-
ing the slippery framework (Kirchler, Hoelzl & Whal, 
2008) as a theoretical lens the authors examine how 
the enforcement style of an oversight body affects how 
audit firms react to inspections. 
1.2 The slippery-slope framework
The slippery-slope framework describes how regula-
tees behave and comply with regulations (Kirchler et 
al., 2008). The main idea of the framework is that com-
pliance behavior depends on how a regulator exercises 
power on the one hand and the amount of trust between 
regulator and regulatee on the other.
 
Power refers to the likelihood that the regulator will 
detect and punish non-compliance with the objective 
to adjust behavior of the regulatee (Kirchler et al., 
2008). A regulator that conducts frequent inspections 
and punishes misbehavior with high penalties is seen 
as having high power. In contrast, a regulator that is 
negligent with inspections and rarely imposes sanc-
tions on noncompliance has low power.
Debate on Public Audit Oversight 
enforcement: it is all about  
procedural justice?
Joost van Buuren and Annie Wong
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SUMMARY  This article provides a reflection of the paper as presented and dis-
cussed at the FAR conference of 9 and 10 May 2016 “Public Oversight of audit 
firms: the slippery slope of enforcing regulation” written by Robert Knechel, Carlin 
Dowling and Robyn Moroney (hereafter KDM, 2016). KDM describe the perceptions 
of auditors from the Big 4 audit firms and the regulator1 in Australia regarding the 
correlation between regulatory enforcement style and its perceived impact on audit 
quality. We believe the paper is relevant and timely, because it documents well the 
current divergence of perceptions between auditors and regulators on how to con-
tinue their pursuit for higher audit quality. We argue that the paper could be 
strengthened by offering the authors’ views on what is required from both parties to 
realign their expectations.
PRACTICAL RELEVANCE  The external oversight of auditors has been operational 
for nearly a decade. Although the interviewed auditors seem positive about the ef-
fects of regulation on audit quality in the past years, the current enforcement style is 
perceived to be coercive and appears to trigger unintended effects. We argue that 
an increase of procedural justice might help to align mutual expectations between 
auditors and regulators. In our view, an important first step in this process is to 
clearly define audit quality, because enhancing audit quality was the motivation of 
establishing audit oversight. In all, the paper by KDM fuels the need for a dialogue 
on the effectiveness of auditor oversight.
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In the slippery-slope model by Kirchler et al. (2008), a 
regulator is considered to exercise power on a contin-
uum from a full-coercive approach to a full-collabora-
tive approach. The coercive approach refers to the use 
of full power to enforce compliance. Consequently, the 
coercive authority imposes fear and uses punishments 
to enforce compliance. In contrast, in the collaborative 
approach the regulator takes a low power, facilitative 
enforcement role; the regulator educates and supports 
the regulatee in making the right choices. Thus, the 
regulator-regulatee relationship in the collaborative 
enforcement style is not built on exercising power, but 
instead on trust.
Further, the slippery-slope model suggests that a reg-
ulator can achieve full compliance regardless of the en-
forcement style: either by exercising high power in the 
coercive enforcement style or by increasing trust in the 
collaborative style.
1.3 Audit quality and enforcement style 
In their study, KDM report that the Australian audit 
partners perceive the enforcement style of the Austral-
ian regulator, the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC), as predominantly coercive; the 
publicly available inspection reports and media head-
lines are examples of the coercive use of the regulator’s 
power. This coercive enforcement style renders a lot of 
power to the ASIC, but at the same time impedes the 
development of perceived trust between the two par-
ties. The results as presented in the paper suggest a 
mismatch between the perceptions of auditors and au-
dit authorities regarding the effectiveness of enforce-
ment styles to enhance audit quality. The regulator’s 
perception is that with an increase in enforced compli-
ance, audit quality improves: rules and standards es-
tablish an understanding of audit firm responsibilities 
and inspections are important to identify hazards for 
corrective action. Auditors however believe that an 
abundance of rules is not beneficial to audit quality 
and might even lead to unintended effects, such as 
ticking-the-box and form over substance approaches. 
For instance, KDM report that auditors spend extra 
time on areas that the regulator considers important, 
even when in their view it adds little value to the audit. 
This finding suggests that audit firms anticipate in-
spections by addressing issues solely in order to satis-
fy the inspectors’ expectations, and not for reasons of 
audit quality. KDM argue that the implementation of 
rules is important to safeguard against audit failures, 
but the audit regulator must be careful that it does not 
exceed the so-called ‘tipping-point’: the threshold 
where enforced compliance starts having adverse ef-
fects on audit quality. Hence, KDM advocate that reg-
ulators should reflect on their prevailing enforcement 
style and consider whether it actually improves audit 
quality or gives rise to unwanted effects. 
In the next section, we will provide some feedback on 
the assumptions made in the paper and provide sugges-
tions on how to strengthen the relevance of the paper.
2 Discussion 
2.1 Concerns regarding the slippery slope framework
We appreciate that the authors try to theoretically ex-
plain why and how enforcement styles can trigger high-
er compliance, but we doubt whether the slippery slope 
framework by Kirchler et al. (2008) is appropriate for 
this purpose. Our main concerns include the validity 
of the (implicit) assumptions in the slippery slope 
model for the public auditing context and the appro-
priateness of the concept of ‘trust’.
2.1.1 Validity of assumptions 
First of all, we argue that a high level of compliance 
can only be reached if there are clear, unequivocally in-
terpreted compliance rules. For example, in the case of 
the determination of income taxes - for which the slip-
pery slope was originally developed -, a lot of detailed 
rules are developed. Consequently, in most cases, there 
will be no discussion on how to determine the taxable 
income and the amount of taxes to be paid. In the case 
of disagreement, the company is able to appeal against 
the tax assessment and the court will decide on how 
to interpret a tax rule. Because the rules are clear and 
strict, the tax authorities are able to enforce tax com-
pliance to a high level. In other words, the concept of 
‘clarity of the rules’ is missing in the framework. With-
out clear rules, the tax authorities cannot effectively 
enforce compliance, whatever strong powers the tax 
authorities have (like fines, jail, etc.). Thus, clear rules 
are an essential condition to be able to comply in the 
first place. As discussed later, we argue that the current 
public auditing context does not (always) meet this 
condition.
Second, the slippery slope model assumes that a 100% 
compliance is possible, independent of the selected en-
forcement strategy. Achieving a 100% compliance score 
is a strong assumption, even for rules-based tax frame-
works. Moreover, because the model suggests that a 
100% compliance can be achieved regardless of the se-
lected enforcement style, the selection of the enforce-
ment style is reduced to a simple equation of costs and 
benefits; hence the tax authority or regulator should 
select the cheapest strategy. Although the model is only 
used as a ‘theoretical lens’ by KDM, we believe the as-
sumptions used in the model are possibly too strong 
to be valid in a real life tax enforcement situation it 
tries to describe. 
Third, besides concerns regarding the external validi-
ty of the slippery slope model itself, we question 
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whether this model is appropriate as a theoretical lens 
to describe the perceptions of the effectiveness of en-
forcement strategies of audit supervision authorities 
by auditors and regulators. As mentioned before, the 
slippery slope framework is developed for the context 
of the rules-based tax compliance context. The tax 
compliance context is quite different from the public 
auditing context. First, the objective of the tax rules 
are clear: determine the taxable income and the 
amount of taxes to be paid. In the case of auditing, the 
objective is open for different interpretations: assur-
ance should be delivered on whether the financial 
statements represent a ‘true and fair view’. Besides that 
the concept of a ‘true and fair view’ does not result in 
black and white accounting solutions (e.g., think of a 
valid range of fair value estimates), there is no com-
monly accepted definition of audit quality (IAASB, 
2015c; DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Knechel et al., 2012). 
Audit quality is not defined in the auditing standards: 
it is only mentioned once that the audit partner should 
“emphasize (a) the importance to audit quality [...] and 
(b) the fact that quality is essential in performing au-
dit engagements.” (IAASB, 2015a, par. A3, p.140). Fur-
thermore, even in the Framework of Audit Quality, the 
IAASB refrains from providing a definition of audit 
quality (IAASB, 2015b, appendix 1, par. 1, p.40). If the 
objective of the audit and hence audit quality is not 
well defined, we argue that it is hard to develop meas-
ures that increase the level of audit quality, let alone 
how to enforce audit quality. In other words, contrary 
to the tax context, it is difficult to set a minimum lev-
el of audit quality, let alone the complexities of defin-
ing the highest level of audit quality possible in a con-
text of extensive professional judgment.  
Fourth, by using the slippery slope model as a theoret-
ical lens, it is unclear whether and to which extent 
KDM consider self-regulation and professional virtues 
as an effective means to safeguard compliance of au-
diting standards. The paper is silent on why auditors 
are reluctant to comply with auditing standards result-
ing in the need of a regulator: is it because of a lack of 
professional virtues or because audit quality is too un-
clear and too vague? 
2.1.2 Procedural justice
One alternative way to interpret KDM’s research re-
sults is to apply the concept of procedural justice. In 
our reading of the results, there seems to be a lack of 
procedural justice. Procedural justice “concerns how 
justice is administered. Key aspects of a just legal sys-
tem are that the procedures are fair and transparent.” 
(Brooks & Dunn, 2012, p. 146). In the case of auditing 
supervision, the regulator’s decision-making process 
is perceived by auditors as a black box; it may be even 
injustice towards auditors. Further, auditors perceive 
reluctance to appeal against the regulator’s decisions, 
because the regulator represents both the supervisor 
role and grants the audit licenses. Moreover, the audit 
professionals do not appreciate the generalized con-
clusions in the regulators’  reports, because the con-
clusions are based on a  small, in their view not repre-
sentative, sample, but they are communicated as being 
representative for the ‘current state of audit quality de-
livered by the audit firms’. Such concerns by audit pro-
fessionals signal low perceived procedural justice: 
transparency on how findings are weighted and inter-
preted by the regulator in its verdict regarding the au-
dit quality and when - based on what criteria - a find-
ing is considered representative for the audit firm or 
the audit profession as a whole. 
We argue that the trust in the fairness of audit over-
sight goes beyond the performance of the audit super-
visory agency and its employees: it is about ‘trust in the 
supervisory system itself ’.  In other words, trust in the 
system of audit oversight does not only depend on 
whether the audit oversight inspector has experience 
in examining the quality of audit files properly. We ar-
gue that trust is primarily driven by the fact that an in-
spector followed the audit oversight procedures prop-
erly. 
Let us explain the difference with the example used by 
KDM: speeding tickets. The rules for car-driving in 
western countries are developed in a democratic pro-
cess based on common power sharing (trias politica): 
legislature (parliament), an executive (police), and a ju-
diciary (judges). So, if parliament intends to make so-
ciety safer, it authorizes a traffic law. In a good traffic 
law and associated implemented acts, the principles 
and rules are described in terms of what is allowed in 
traffic (which vehicles are allowed on the public roads), 
what is prohibited (maximum speed limits), the en-
forcement process (allowed speed detection methods 
including calibrating of speedometers and training of 
officers) and the enforcement power (stopping of cars, 
proportionate punishment, including transparent and 
consistent determination of fines, when drivers should 
be prosecuted, who is allowed to impose fines and right 
of appeal, etc.). Imagine a car driver who is stopped by 
a police officer for speeding. The trust of the car driv-
er in the enforcement regime will not be primarily 
based on whether the police officer acts in a nice man-
ner or his or her high personal experience with enforc-
ing speed limits, it will be based on the validity of the 
enforcement action;
a.  There should be a valid reason: the correctly cali-
brated speedometer objectively detected speeding;
b.  Based on the formal procedure and the use of the 
formal tables (preferably an automated decision) 
the punishment is determined: a fine based on a for-
mally authorized tables, given the circumstances;
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c.  The car driver will receive a formal speeding tick-
et and preferably pays it the to the fine govern-
mental collecting agency, not to the police officer 
directly;
d.  The car driver is informed about the right to ap-
peal and how and to which extent privacy proce-
dures apply.
Similarly, in the case of enforcing compliance of audit-
ing standards, we argue that procedural justice is the 
driver of perceived trust in the supervisor. In order to 
satisfy the procedural justice in the audit oversight 
context, the supervisor should - in our view - meet the 
following requirements: 
a.  Valid reasons to accuse an auditor of delivering im-
proper audits. This requirement includes a validat-
ed and transparent process of (1) assessing audit 
quality and (2) decision-making regarding the final 
conclusion: acceptable or not-acceptable audit qual-
ity. Note that ‘assessing audit quality’ requires an 
appropriate benchmark of what audit quality is, i.e., 
a clear and comprehensive definition of audit qual-
ity, a validated measurement instrument of audit 
quality, a review team with sufficient knowledge and 
experience, and a process in which review quality is 
safeguarded. The decision-making process requires 
at least a proper audi alteram partem (‘hear the other 
side too’) and checks and balances to safeguard a 
well-balanced and objective decision-making pro-
cess by the regulator;
b.  Based on the conclusion of the review outcome, the 
punishment should be determined in a transparent 
and consistent manner and in such a way that au-
ditors will not be surprised by the sanction. Con-
sistent and transparent determination of sanctions 
requires formally authorized and publicly available 
categories of auditor misconduct and the related 
sanctions;
c.  The destination of the fine payments should be 
transparent and, to ensure objectivity, not be bene-
ficial to the supervisor itself. Preferably, the fines 
should be beneficial to supporting the objective of 
increasing the level of audit quality, like research 
projects;
d.  A transparent procedure is adopted for the right of 
appeal against a decision by the supervisor and a 
complaint procedure in the case of inspector mis-
conduct;
e.  A transparent procedure with checks and balances 
on how and which review findings are communicat-
ed to the public and how the quality of such reports 
is safeguarded. An important aspect in this respect 
is how, i.e., based on what criteria, the findings of a 
small inspection sample are generalized to the qual-
ity delivered by an audit firm or the auditing pro-
fession as a whole.
In the paper by KDM, there are a lot of quotes suggest-
ing frustrations by audit partners related to the re-
quirement of ‘validity’ of the accusation of auditor 
misconduct regarding audit quality. We argue that the 
lack of a proper definition of audit quality and hence 
the lack of an objective measurement of audit quality, 
can be an important source of these frustrations. In 
the paper, there are also findings regarding the gener-
alizations and tone of the supervisor’s report on audit 
quality.
2.2  Relationship between enforcement-styles, compliance and 
perceived audit quality
2.2.1 Positive effect of auditor oversight
The results as reported by KDM suggest that about 
80% of the maximum level of audit quality is already 
met and that the current debate between the auditors 
and the regulator concerns the last 20%. Interestingly, 
KDM suggest that the regulator believes that an even 
stronger coercive enforcement style will enable a 100% 
audit quality level. However, in the paper, no informa-
tion is provided on what kind of audit quality the reg-
ulator is envisioning. The auditors, however, believe 
that a stronger coercive enforcement style is likely to 
result in a lower level of audit quality. Unfortunately, 
in the current version of the paper, no information is 
provided on what this 20% actually represents and why 
the perceptions of the regulator and the auditors dif-
fer significantly. Some quotes in the paper seem to 
point into the direction that different views exist be-
tween the regulator and the auditor what audit quali-
ty actually represents. 
2.2.2 Agreement is seemingly a possibility
Interestingly, the results as reported by KDM suggest 
that during the period in which the auditors and the 
regulator perceived a positive effect of auditor over-
sight, both auditors and regulator also perceived the 
then applied collaborative enforcement style as ‘effec-
tive’. The paper however, is relatively silent on this pe-
riod and focuses on the shift towards the coercive en-
forcement style. The quotes in the paper clearly suggest 
the coercive enforcement style renders a lot of frustra-
tion among the auditors. However, it could be inter-
esting to address the question why and when the dis-
crepancy between the two parties started. Would 
different expectations regarding audit quality help ex-
plain this phenomenon? Or due to differences in am-
bition regarding the level of audit quality to be 
achieved? Why did the supervisor change its enforce-
ment style or is this ‘style change’ a misperception by 
the auditors? Finally, it would be interesting to further 
elaborate on why the supervisor started to use a com-
munication style with generalizations that are only 
based on small samples.
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examine why and when the perceptions regarding the 
effectiveness of the enforcement style started to differ 
between auditors and regulators. Further, in our view 
it would be relevant for future research to consider 
what is needed to align mutual expectations between 
auditors and inspectors again. Possibly, examining 
how other industries, such as education and medicine, 
cope with inspections might be an interesting starting 
point. Finally, we emphasize the importance to prior-
itize the development of a clear and comprehensive 
definition of audit quality.  
3 Conclusion and research opportunities
In all, the paper addresses an important and emerging 
topic in the auditing profession. With the focus on ex-
amining the perceived effectiveness of auditor over-
sight enforcement styles on audit quality, the authors 
initiate an important debate: are the auditing profes-
sion and the oversight body heading in the right direc-
tion? In our view, this debate should lead to the devel-
opment of an effective auditing oversight enforcement 
model, supported by both the public and the auditing 
profession.
In order to achieve this, we would like to suggest the 
following. First, future research may consider the the-
oretical analysis of the results from the perspective of 
procedural justice, because it may be an explanation 
for the frustration voiced by the audit partners in the 
quotes in the KDM-paper. Second, future research can 
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On May 9, 2016, the first day of the FAR conference, a 
panel discussion was chaired by professor Henriëtte 
Prast (Chair of the FAR Board). Four stakeholders - an 
audit practitioner, an academic, a non-executive direc-
tor, and an audit regulator – presented and discussed 
their thoughts about the following issues
 • how to improve audit quality,
 • the importance of collaboration between academics 
and practitioners (and the role of FAR therein), 
 • the oversight and regulatory climate, and 
 • the stakeholder expectations of auditors.  
Participants welcomed the opportunity to discuss 
these issues with Marco van der Vegte (Head of Audit 
of Deloitte the Netherlands and FAR Board member), 
Barbara Majoor (on behalf of Authority Financial Mar-
kets (AFM, the Dutch auditor oversight body), Jan 
Nooitgedagt (non-executive director), and Marleen 
Willekens (audit researcher at the University of Leu-
ven).  In the following narrative report the interactive 
debate on a multi-stakeholder perspective on audit 
quality and audit research is presented.
Marco van der Vegte, partner at Deloitte and mem-
ber of the FAR Board.
Q: What do expect from FAR as the “love baby” of the audit 
industry and academics?
I have high expectations because a good relation be-
tween the profession and the academic world can 
really add value. In this respect I would like to share 
some thoughts about what encompasses audit quali-
ty from the following four perspectives: 
1. audit team and audit firm;
2. audit client and the supervisory board;
3. the regulator;
4. the public. 
In my view we need a broader concept of audit quality 
also encompassing the audit process and users’ expe-
riences instead of a narrow compliance quality perspec-
tive. This is important because the quality of our work 
is at the core of our existence and determines our so-
cietal relevance. Audit quality is affected by audit firms, 
the profession, audit clients, the regulators, the pub-
lic and our employees not to forget. Being a role mod-
el of quality, integrity and being able to positively 
adopt to change is key. It is also important that audi-
tors recognize relevant matters and take the opportu-
nity to make an impact and create what I would call 
an exceptional experience. The moment that “matters” 
could be an event or irregularity at the client where the 
auditor steps up, informs the supervisory board and if 
needed the regulator and public at large. 
In other words, a relevant characteristic of audit quali-
ty is “a unique client experience”. If we agree that an au-
dit is a process or a project, unique client experiences 
should be of a consistent high level as quality should be 
consistent. We should also recognize that culture and 
behavior are the primary drivers of audit quality im-
provements. In this respect I emphasize that rewarding 
people who deliver consistently high quality positively, 
is a basic fundament for enhancing audit quality.
The following issues are relevant from a quality per-
spective for both audit firm and team:
 • assessing the culture as audit firm;
 • a portfolio analysis of business risks of the audit firm;
 • a deep understanding of clients’ business;
 • targeted response to risk assessment;
 • identify and act on moments that matter most;
 • demonstrate professional skepticism;
 • increased transparency for example by including Key 
Audit Matters in the auditor’s report. But as an au-
dit firm we have to consider how to further increase 
transparency on what we have been doing and how 
we integrate technology and analytics in the audit 
process;
 • finally, how we can provide a meaningful experience 
for talent and at the same time organize good team 
spirit and effort.
Panel discussion:  
A multi-stakeholder perspective on 
audit quality and audit research
Philip Wallage
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If we look from an audit client and supervisory board 
perspective, quality encompasses a thorough audit 
process, no surprises and meeting deadlines. But 
quality also means that firm and auditor are able to 
deliver valuable insights and also use latest technol-
ogy. Someone who is able to early identify issues and 
offers solutions at reasonable costs.  The question is 
if clients are interested in the findings of inspections 
by regulators. Based upon US and UK experiences, it 
is still unclear whether the supervisory boards will 
choose a specific audit firm based on findings of in-
spections by regulators. There are also clients that 
just want a painless process, a smooth audit and 
nothing more.
My observation is that regulators assess firm culture 
and behavior as drivers of audit quality but at the same 
moment test compliance of the audit process with the 
applicable auditing standards, relevant laws and regu-
lation. 
Finally, audit quality from the perspective of the pub-
lic. They see an audit firm as a role model for integri-
ty, objectivity and executing audits that, unless indi-
cated otherwise, confirms the going concern of the 
company and identifies all areas of non-compliance.
Q: Culture is something relatively static, it slowly changes over 
time. However, the audit sector nowadays acknowledges that 
culture is important and has to change. You have people in 
business for longer periods of time who are part of the culture. 
Don’t you need new influx if you want to change culture in 
your firm? 
It starts with realizing that we are a regulated busi-
ness. Having that recognition starts with our own 
management and supervisory boards. We should be 
aware that, being a regulated profession, we have to 
meet the expectations of the public and that we had 
to change our mindset in the last couple of years of 
what we believe is quality. Our audit partners and ex-
ternal auditors have to realize again that audit qual-
ity really matters and drives our performance and re-
muneration. Therefore we have to be sure that a 
balanced set of performance measures is in place. The 
bar for audit partners has been raised in recent years 
and some of them were not able to meet this bar left 
the firm. Changing the tone of our accountants is 
more difficult than changing the tone of a new stu-
dent. You need new students who are capable to 
change the culture of the firm. The influx of the last 
three to four years already has a totally different back-
ground than people that are in for twenty years. That 
is a change in itself. Involving young people with six 
to eight years of experience in your audit quality pro-
gram has a great impact. 
Q: Do you think something has to change in the curriculum of 
the students who want to become auditors to enable them to 
contribute to a cultural change?
What can help improving culture - and there is already 
a lot of effort taken there – is for example team build-
ing and looking for new ways to set the tone of audit 
staff. We can positively influence mindsets at univer-
sity as well as at firm level. However, compared with 
twenty years ago, the mindset is probably not that dif-
ferent. In my view the impact of regulators, media as 
well as of the public changed significantly partly 
caused by audit failures.
The second speaker is Barbara Majoor. Barbara is pro-
fessor at Nyenrode University. She has been partner at 
KPMG and Deloitte and is currently working with the 
AFM, which is the Auditors Oversight Body in the 
Netherlands.
I would like to share some thoughts about audit qual-
ity from the perspective of the regulator. A regulator 
in fact defines audit quality as having sufficient appro-
priate audit evidence to justify the audit opinion. In 
the Netherlands we apply a relatively simple system. 
An audit file could have sufficient audit evidence or in-
sufficient audit evidence. In the past (2014) the publi-
cation of our inspection report confirmed the need for 
improvement of audit quality. The establishment of 
FAR is one of the measures taken by the profession. 
We think a thoroughly root cause analyses is of great 
importance. Researchers could help us to develop 
methods to perform such analyses systematically to 
understand the real drivers for audit quality. 
I will share some further thoughts about audit quali-
ty from a regulatory perspective. The quality of the au-
dit is depending on the view and perception of other 
important stakeholders like investors and audit com-
mittees as well. This is an important area for further 
research. We think that one of the important drivers 
is the culture within an audit firm as culture can shape 
individual behavior. Behavior of partners, staff and 
other employees determine audit firm culture. We 
think that the introduction of new governance meas-
ures within audit firms will improve audit quality. In 
the Netherlands all big audit firms already introduced 
supervisory boards to monitor the board, having a spe-
cific role in driving audit quality. Last but not least, the 
expertise and experience of the individuals (partner, 
staff etc.) drive audit quality. In other words, know-
ledge and competence of the partner, culture-oriented 
factors like leadership and team composition contrib-
ute to audit quality. Culture also embraces softer ca-
pabilities that affect audit quality, such as the system 
of evaluation, appraisal and remuneration of individ-
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uals. And of course audit quality is supported by up to 
date auditing standards and methodology.  It won’t 
surprise that the oversight strategy of the Dutch reg-
ulator focuses on inspection of audit files but also on 
monitoring culture, behavior and whether firms are 
implementing improvement measures to maintain and 
strengthen audit quality. In our regulatory system we 
use both instruments and they should interact in our 
strive to improve audit quality.
Q: Given the fact that your employer (regulator) has conclud-
ed that several audits did not meet standards, does that mean 
that auditors lack expertise and competence? Other question, 
when talking about culture, rewards and good behavior, do 
you suggest that there should not be focus on intrinsic motiva-
tion but good behavior should be triggered by external incen-
tives like money?
We don’t believe that, if an audit file is not up to stand-
ards, the root cause is always pointing towards a lack 
of competence. Auditors could have the right compe-
tences but they were not or incorrectly applied in a spe-
cific audit. There could be other “root causes” like time 
pressure, unbalanced team composition, teams not be-
ing challenged enough, etc. As mentioned before, aca-
demic research could help understanding this kind of 
root causes and drivers of audit quality. 
Regarding your second question, we believe that in the 
end auditors are most of the time motivated to do a 
good audit but you can help them in shaping their be-
havior. We would be happy if all auditors were intrin-
sically motivated to deliver high quality but we have to 
be realistic as we don’t live in an ideal world. 
Jan Nooitgedagt is former CFO of Aegon NV and is 
currently member of several supervisory boards and 
audit committees. He has been an auditor in public 
practice for thirty years. 
Q: I was just wondering, what went wrong the last 20 years? 
Your question reminds me of an experience in my ear-
ly years as junior staff member.  A senior partner visit-
ed one of our clients in a bad financial condition and 
said to the director that his car was too big and too ex-
pensive. He said if you don’t change your car, I don’t 
want to audit the financial statements anymore. That 
kind of behavior created a memorable impression. The 
partner was able to say what you probably, can’t say to 
a company director anymore. I think something went 
wrong over the last 20 years. The FAR should research 
the reasons thereto. 
I have a couple of statements to share with you that 
could give some further insights. One of my observa-
tions as auditor and board member is that the profes-
sion should be more proud of the services being of-
fered. The audit profession is key for all stakeholders, 
including investors, regulators, board members and so 
on. I really appreciated my auditor when I was CFO 
who told me what went well and what went wrong 
anywhere in the world.  And don’t forget, information 
from the business units upwards is always filtered as 
they want to please you as they depend upon you. I be-
came more aware of the importance of the auditor’s 
role after leaving the profession. Again, we have to re-
store the trust of all stakeholders. 
One of my concerns is that I feel, and I might be wrong, 
that there have not been major developments in audit 
techniques, methods, software. Recently a US colleague 
told me that the whole audit profession can be auto-
mated. I have not seen it yet, but it would not surprise 
me if at least testing and checking would become ful-
ly automated processes. But of course a lot has changed 
in a positive way. In my view audit firm rotation is a 
positive development, the extended auditor’s opinion 
will add value and also the role of the auditor in share-
holders meetings is improving and adding value. These 
have been positive changes, but as said before chang-
es in audit techniques have been insufficient. I also feel 
that auditors should more and more challenge the 
board and discuss techniques, risk assessment and con-
trols. In this respect I would welcome research into the 
quality of discussions between auditors and boards as 
a very relevant research topic.
Already from the early days of the profession, the big 
issue is that the auditor will be paid by the auditee. I 
know it’s still true but I don’t hope that it will ever 
change. I don’t see a net positive effect if a suprana-
tional government body will decide who will be the au-
ditor and pay the bill. But given the size of the big 4 
and opportunities for growth, you have to ask your-
self: is the audit the core product or is it a by-product? 
I think this question should be central in future dis-
cussions. Do we really need to have audit-only firms? 
I think that won’t be easy as consultancy services are 
in general much more profitable than audits. I remem-
ber in my time as Chair of the Board of EY we had to 
fight to keep our large financial audit clients because 
we could sell a lot of consultancy services instead.  In 
my view, audit should be at least the key product of the 
audit firms including the big four. It won’t surprise 
but you as researchers could also help answering this 
important question.
Q: You just shared that your children don’t want to become an 
auditor. Could you tell us what were their mean objections?
They probably haven’t seen their father that much. Be-
ing an auditor is a tough job. You have to work also 
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during weekends. I remember we were not allowed to 
go skiing between January and May. Lot of young peo-
ple want to go skiing and spend their time alternative-
ly. Another reason could be that accountancy is prob-
ably not that sexy anymore. 
Q: You were saying that your experience is that there was some 
pressure on doing other things like consultancy instead of au-
dit services. At least in the minds of the employees this  could 
make audits less interesting. Could that also affect the culture 
of the firm?
In my experience it is very difficult to have different 
disciplines who have different business models and 
profit profiles. It is almost impossible that one disci-
pline is twice as profitable as other disciplines. In the 
end people don’t want to share profits or losses with 
each other. What is helping is that the audit is becom-
ing more profitable again. I hope that auditors will be 
as profitable again as other services being offered. If 
not, than it will become difficult for firm leadership to 
keep all professionals satisfied. 
Marleen Willekens is professor of accounting and au-
diting at the University of Leuven.
I would like to reflect on audit quality and the link be-
tween practice and academia. When I was preparing 
for this talk some issues came up in my mind. First 
what is audit quality but also what have we learned, 
what do we not know about audit quality. There is a 
lot we do not know but a lot has been discussed already 
today [and reflected in this MAB issue]. One of the rea-
sons we lack understanding, is that a lot of relevant 
data are not available for researchers. There are prob-
ably other reasons too. In this respect I would like to 
ask our colleagues here why regulators are not always 
interested in what we find in audit research. I remem-
ber for example the EU Green Paper1 about the audit 
profession that included rather extreme statements 
that were not really backed up by available research 
findings. What can we do about this? 
Over the years I have felt that a lot of the people in prac-
tice are also not that interested in what we study. I can 
actually understand that to a large extend, but why is 
practice than not using us more often? We are free and 
independent researchers. We can tell you things about 
your organization if we get the right data. Why has that 
not happened in the past? I am sure there is an explana-
tion for all that we could talk about together. 
Now, let us go back to the concept of audit quality. 
There are a number of audit quality frameworks out 
there. Basically if we look into the audit quality frame-
work of the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB),  it says that input is import-
ant, output is important, there is context and there is 
also interaction between the stakeholders involved. 
When we zoom in on inputs and outputs, what they 
also say in that framework is that there are different 
levels that matter. The auditors level, the engagement, 
the audit firm, national level, or office level and I can 
even think of more levels. We have to take the level into 
account as researchers. To link this to research we are 
going to look at all these elements at the different lev-
els that have been specified in the framework. That 
means that we need data on that and in general terms 
the data that could be used are available within the 
firms. Data about engagements teams, background of 
team members, independence codes, how competen-
cies are stimulated, education. But also on firm level, 
what is the governance structure, quality control sys-
tems and so on. 
When we look at the input level, we don’t know much 
because of lack of data. We know more about the out-
put because more information is available in the pub-
lic domain, like audit reporting, earnings quality but 
also transparency reports. Here we have done a lot 
more academic work. Now moving on, if we want to 
open the audit firm black box, what relevant questions 
could we try to answer? One question is ‘what is the ef-
fect of the variable audit firm level control and quali-
ty mechanisms on the quality of audit engagements?’ 
Another question we could address is about human re-
source practices of different audit firms and how to 
link that to style elements as recognized in prior archi-
val work. Another question is how audit team compo-
sition affects audit quality. Most current research stud-
ies still have an implicit audit firm constant quality 
assumption. We can investigate the impact of such 
characteristics on audit quality in future research.
I also think that the incremental effect of auditing on 
the quality of financial information is something that 
we haven’t explored a lot because relevant data about 
the audit and its effect on the financial statements is 
not available up to now.  If this data is made available 
to academics, the incremental effect could be studied 
as well as how the primary attributes of an audit effect 
the various indicators that have been specified in the 
frameworks. So getting more data about attributes like 
audit methodology and audit process steps. 
We have seen in several studies that “one size does not 
fit all”. In the study we presented earlier today [as in-
cluded in the paper of Nolder and Duiverman in this 
MAB issue] we had different types of clients in our 
sample.
Different stakeholders had different expectations and 
different types of organizations may value audit qual-
ity differently. We still know very little about this kind 
of differences. 
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Finally, a lot of interesting experimental work in au-
diting research is already available that have looked at 
judgmental issues. What we could label archival judg-
ment research and actually based on working papers 
and information that we get from audit firms, validate 
some or several of these studies and see whether those 
results that have been obtained from experimental 
studies are actually holding when we are doing them 
again with archival data. This was in a nutshell what I 
wanted to share with you and let’s hope that we make 
progress here together. 
Further questions 
Q. Is it hard for audit committees to assess audit quality and 
what can be done to improve that?
Jan Nooitgedagt: Most audit committee members are 
not auditors by education. They don’t exactly know 
what audit techniques are and how an audit is per-
formed. It all starts with risk assessment of the com-
pany, what you do internally as audit committee and 
what the auditor is doing, comparing that and having 
discussions about the main issues and the audit ap-
proach. But there are huge differences in audit com-
mittees in understanding of what auditors exactly do 
and of what methods and techniques auditors apply. 
Barbara Majoor: It is hard for audit committees to re-
ally understand the audit process of gathering audit 
evidence. What kind of techniques the team is apply-
ing, how they assess the information and how they 
draw their conclusions is difficult to understand. In 
my view audit quality indicators can help to solve this 
problem. Further research should make clear which in-
dicators are linked to audit quality in practice. 
Q. Why are regulators not so much interested in research and 
why didn’t they do more with research results?
Barbara Majoor: A regulator has to deal with many 
stakeholders, politicians for example. I think regula-
tors don’t always have time to take research into ac-
count, because in case of incidents politicians want to 
respond very quickly by taking measures.  It would be 
great if research could help to evaluate incidents in-
cluding taking measures.
Q: The focus of the audit are the financial statements but more 
than once a client said that there is much more next to the fi-
nancial statements. Audits could help to improve clients inter-
nal control system as well. For academics it may be an import-
ant question: what is the value of an audit?
Marleen Willekens: The added value of the audit is 
much more than just checking the financial state-
ments. What comes out of the process can lead to rec-
ommendations that may improve various systems but 
also other suggestions. I also think that this is very 
much dependent of the type of organization you are 
auditing. 
Marco van der Vegte: There are a lot of things that 
come with the audit like for example we do culture as-
sessment at clients. As part of understanding the tone-
at-the-top, which is also a key driver for a company for 
their own quality. What’s their tone at the top and 
what drives the mentality and the mindset of a com-
pany? We do culture assessments as part of the audit. 
So I can give numerous examples of things we do in an 
audit that are not visible to the public but which can 
also sell the audit as a service much better.
Jan Nooitgedagt: I must admit that nobody is talking 
about audit quality during the selection process of a 
new auditor. That is an interesting research question, 
why is the selection of an auditor not based on audit 
quality?
Q: what is the role of audit clients in this regard? Why don’t 
audit committees understand what the auditor really does? Is 
this because the auditor and the company don’t talk about the 
engagement at all or is this completely dealt with by the CFO, 
instead of the audit committee? 
Jan Nooitgedagt: The latest development is that we 
need persons with a finance background in an audit 
committee but I also see more and more people like 
myself with an audit background. I think that there is 
a difference if you do or don’t understand the language 
of an auditor. I don’t believe that it is a lack of com-
munication any more, the auditor is always attending 
the meetings of audit committees.  The issue is that 
the discussions become more and more technical and 
difficult to follow for non-auditors. 
Marco van der Vegte: What we have been seeing is that 
auditors were extremely busy with the team to make 
sure that they were compliant with the standards to be 
tested by peers and by regulators. Now we see improve-
ments, it is time again to think about what is the val-
ue of the audit. For example, I had a session last week 
for two days with professionals from ten countries to 
do role plays from the perspectives of the audit com-
mittee, the CEO, the controller and others versus the 
audit team. We concluded there are some communi-
cation issues. For example, we concluded that our as-
sumption that the CEO does not have time for us and 
is less interested because we are irrelevant to him is in-
correct. In the end the CEO also wants to talk to the 
auditor. Playing these role games can help understand 
our stakeholders in such a way that we as auditors can 
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become proud and enthusiastic again and regain pub-
lic trust. 
Q: we talk a lot about the supply side of auditing how to im-
prove audit quality but I think that the question is on the de-
mand side of audit quality. What are the demand side issues 
and where is the demand for audit quality coming from? Who 
is the customer for audit quality?
Jan Nooitgedagt: We have to admit that if we wouldn’t 
have the oversight body of accountants (AFM) I don’t 
know if we would have discussed this topic this seri-
ous today. 
Marco van der Vegte: That is also a difference if we look 
at how we are being regulated in the Netherlands and 
in the US versus countries very close nearby. The mind-
set is really different. The openness and the discussions 
that we have here are different from those when I talk 
to my component auditors in Germany. For example 
because they do have a different mindset on what is 
audit quality and what drives audit quality. 
Q: do you think that investors in other countries care about 
audit quality? 
Marco van der Vegte: I am sure they care about audit 
quality. In the end they want assurance that the finan-
cial statements are free of material misstatements. 
Jan Nooitgedagt: I have to disappoint you here. I did 
many road shows in my role as CFO but nobody ever 
asked me about the auditors’ opinion. 
Barbara Majoor: I think when everything is going well 
nobody talks about audit quality while in case of an 
incident everybody will be talking about audit quality 
and asking for further regulation and oversight. Inter-
est for audit quality is always there. 
Marleen Willekens: Actually you could reverse that; if 
everybody talks about it, why would we need a regula-
tor if everybody asks for it? 
Barbara Majoor: If we go back in history, the conse-
quence of some of the incidents is that people ask for 
institutional measures like independent oversight. 
Jan Nooitgedagt: I think that researchers should try to 
answer this question. 
Closing remarks by Henriëtte Prast: I’ve seen a lot of 
the research on audit quality and the regulator’s per-
spective on audit quality seems to adopt the view that 
each additional hour spend on an audit can contrib-
ute equally to audit quality. And I hear that the point 
that was made earlier; why should regulators care 
about audit inefficiency? However, we should recog-
nize that a lot of profitability that we see from audits 
today have been realized on the back of junior audi-
tors who have been asked to work extensive hours. 
My own anecdotal data as a professor is that my best 
and brightest students are no longer attracted to the 
profession because of the incredible demands. They 
say they don’t want to be an auditor because in to-
day’s world the busy season lasts for 12 months a 
year. They want to join a CPA firm but they want to 
work in the consulting branch of the CPA firm. I 
think this has a direct impact on audit quality but I 
don’t have the research to support it but I think fur-
ther studies that assess the human factor and how 
the human factor can contribute to audit quality are 
welcome. All panelists confirm the need to pay atten-
tion to this issue and expect FAR to support this kind 
of studies.  
Dr. Ph. Wallage RA is professor of Auditing at the Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam/Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Notes
See special issue of MAB, 86(5), 2012.
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1 Introduction
The eight largest audit firms in the Netherlands (De-
loitte, EY, KPMG, PwC and Baker Tilly Berk, BDO, 
Grant Thornton and Mazars jointly) have taken the 
initiative to establish the Foundation for Auditing Re-
search (FAR) by providing the necessary research funds 
and research data. Stichting Accountantsfonds has re-
centy joint them. Affiliation with FAR is furthermore 
open for all audit firms and departments, both large 
and small, public audit firms as well as internal audit 
functions and government audit departments. With 
that, FAR provides for a unique collaboration between 
practice and science, strengthening the learning curve 
of the audit industry and its stakeholders, feeding ac-
countancy education, and bolstering the accountancy 
research community in the Netherlands and abroad. 
The affiliated firms will arrange access to relevant au-
dit firm data for well-defined research projects. Audit 
firms have agreed to open up the “black box” of the au-
dit in order to make significant steps forward. 
In return, what do audit firms expect from auditing 
research in general and of the FAR more specifically? 
How do they define audit quality? Which conditions, 
determinants, and root causes do they deem impor-
tant in driving audit quality in daily life? What are 
their main (research) questions? And how do they 
view their contribution in strengthening the bridge 
between practice and science in auditing? The heads 
of audit of three of the eight affiliated audit firms 
spoke during the FAR conference to share their view 
on the relevant research agenda: Egbert Eeftink, Mi-
chael de Ridder, and Marco van der Vegte (the latter 
also as part of the panel discussion as reflected else-
where in this MAB issue), all three also being mem-
bers of the FAR Board. 
This article proceeds to cover these questions as fol-
lows. First in section 2, the view from practice on the 
need for and goals of FAR is detailed, followed by the 
role of the firms themselves in FAR’s objectives in sec-
tion 3. Section 4 covers the firms’ view on how they see 
audit quality and section 5 the areas for research 
strengthening this quality. This article concludes with 
the audit practice’s expectations of the research com-
munity and FAR in section 6.
A view from practice – What  
audit firm leaders expect from 
audit research and how they see 
their role in strengthening the 
bridge between practice and  
science
Olof Bik
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2 The need for FAR
The ultimate reason for establishing FAR was what 
in the Netherlands was called “Freaky Thursday” with 
the publication on September 25, 2014 of three im-
portant reports on the status and plans for improve-
ment of the auditing profession. Michael de Ridder 
illustrates: 
“The trusted auditor was no longer trusted. And that 
really struck at the heart of what makes us relevant. (…) 
But it was also the day when the accountancy profession 
really came to recognize the need for change. Never be-
fore had the intrinsic motivation been so powerful to work 
with full conviction on improving and strengthening our 
profession.” 
It was the Working Group on the Future of the Profes-
sion (2014) proposing 53 measures to strengthen the 
audit profession. One was the establishment of the au-
tonomous research institute that FAR now is. A num-
ber of other important steps have been taken since, 
amongst which the installation of external members 
in the supervisory boards of firms, changes in the re-
muneration policies to focus on quality, and the intro-
duction of audit quality indicators. However, as Mi-
chael de Ridder continues: “We have set a new course, but 
the road to change is still full of challenges. Embedding a qual-
ity- and learning-oriented culture will take time. It’s not just 
a switch that you can turn on or off.”  
The heads of audit support deepening of (root cause) 
analyses as well as putting academic rigor behind po-
tentially effective interventions to improve audit pro-
cess and audit quality, validating and expanding the 
audit quality indicators that really matter to better 
monitor and steer audit quality, and enriching the 
“story of the audit” geared towards better public un-
derstanding of the nature, extent, and value of the au-
dit. In other words of Michael de Ridder: “Getting to 
know the causes of mistakes and entering into real discussion 
on those causes – both internally and externally – aims to put 
an end to an approach that amounts to no more than treating 
the symptoms.” 
3 The role of the firms in auditing research
In the meantime the firms have held promise – FAR is 
established – but more importantly, firms are in good 
spirits to structurally contribute to auditing research 
by providing data and financial support. That is a dis-
tinct change compared to the last two decades. That 
relevance and rigor are two sides of the same coin, was 
not always recognized by both practice and the aca-
demia. Where academics said that researchers need ac-
cess to new and better proprietary firm data on drivers 
of audit quality to take the research on audit quality 
to the next level (e.g., Knechel et al., 2013, pp. 405, 
407)1, practitioners did not always view existing re-
search as being relevant and useful and gave little im-
portance to research in developing auditing practices 
and regulatory policies. To date, however, empirical au-
dit quality research has been inherently limited as re-
searchers have to rely on indirect measures of audit 
quality due to a lack of internal firm data (see the pa-
per of Van Raak and Thürheimer in this issue of MAB). 
This lack of collaboration may be due to “the focus by 
practitioners on short-term problems rather than more 
fundamental and long-term issues, and the research 
incentives of academics to pursue topics that may not 
necessarily be of interest or relevance to practice” 
(Francis, 2011, p. 144). 
Why is it that only now a research institute as FAR has 
been established? The Dutch firms also point the fin-
ger to themselves. Michael de Ridder: 
“It is largely the fault of the audit industry itself that top-
class research on the auditing process was discontinued in 
the nineteen-nineties due to a lack of data from the firms. 
That we, as the founding firms, really are serious this 
time, is clear from the fact that we are making our data 
available. That data is probably more important than the 
money that we are investing in FAR.” 
Hence, FAR provides for a unique opportunity to rec-
oncile these seemingly contradictory perspectives, 
boost collaboration between practice and science, and 
present a research agenda that is both relevant and rig-
orous. Challenges enough, of course, such as getting 
the right data in a reliable way within the boundaries 
of client confidentiality, personnel privacy, and firm li-
ability risk management. But firms are committed and 
up for a well-intended effort to keep their promises to 
the academic community, their stakeholders, and to 
themselves. After all, it are the audit firms that are the 
first to reap fruits from FAR’s endeavors to improve 
audit practices.
4 What is audit quality?
Practitioners acknowledge the fact that there is no uni-
versally agreed definition of what audit quality is. 
Marco van der Vegte, however, presents a clear ambi-
tion for the auditing profession: “Being the organizations 
and the profession that clients, regulators, the public, and tal-
ent hold up as a role model of quality, integrity, and positive 
change”. The sheer challenge for audit firms to deliver 
a “high quality audit” is the question: high quality to 
whom? That even becomes more apparent at the level 
of the audit partners in whose personal judgement and 
decision making the different stakeholders’ perspec-
tives come together and need to be weighted. Marco 
van der Vegte postulates what could be called a multi- 
stakeholder perspective on audit quality, from four 
stakeholder perspectives:
 • From the perspective of the audit team and the au-
dit firm: driving smarter and more effective audits, 
focusing attention on the areas that matter most. 
This includes, amongst other aspects, a deeper un-
derstanding of the client’s business, a targeted 
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response to risk assessment, and increased transpar-
ency through enhanced auditor reporting;
 • From the perspective of the audit client and its su-
pervisory board: a thorough process, without sur-
prises, and meeting deadlines. I.e., a painless audit, 
with early identification and fast resolution of issues, 
at reasonable cost;
 • From the perspective of the regulators: executing an 
audit performed in accordance with applicable 
standards and in compliance with law and regula-
tion, and firms’ management focusing on culture 
and behavior in driving audit quality; and
 • From the perspective of the public: an audit as a role 
model for integrity and executing an audit that, un-
less indicated otherwise, confirms the going concern 
of a company and identifies all areas of non-compli-
ance.
Egbert Eeftink concurs, but also notes that “now more 
than ever, we as practitioners need to be able to articulate 
clearly and consistently what audit quality means to us as 
practitioners and to our stakeholders”. He continues by say-
ing: “Even if we do not exactly know what audit quality is, 
we need a common language, we need audit quality indica-
tors and we need an overall quality framework. This should 
help us talk about the right things, to monitor how we are do-
ing, and to help us steer into the right direction.” From a prac-
tical stance, he details four fundamental needs in driv-
ing audit quality:
 • First of all, auditing contributes to the effective func-
tioning of capital markets by reducing information 
risk. With the globalization of capital markets, au-
diting is increasingly an international service – so we 
need a large degree of consistency in what we do;
 • Second, in an international setting, we communi-
cate about audit quality across a widespread network 
organization, involving teams and audit clients in 
over 100 different countries – so we need a common 
language when we talk about audit quality;
 • Third, even if we do not exactly know what audit 
quality is, we need to be able to monitor how we are 
doing and what we can do to steer and improve our 
performance – so we need audit quality indicators; and
 • Fourth, to safeguard the quality of the complex ser-
vice we provide, we need to be able to demonstrate 
how we do this. If not directly to investors or other 
stakeholders, then at least to our regulators on the 
basis of International Standard on Quality Control 
1 (ISQC1) or its US-equivalent – which means we need 
an overall audit quality control system.
At the same time, Egbert Eeftink warns for what he ap-
pealingly calls the “fatal attraction” of audit quality in-
dicators: 
“There is currently a huge and diverse activity in this 
area; at standard setters, regulators and within audit 
firms. This is an important development and I see the po-
tential in this area. But I am also somewhat concerned 
about the fatal attraction it may have: we should not end 
up with an overload of audit quality indicators that may 
become a goal in itself.”
He points to outcome-based indicators that may be 
the easiest for monitoring of and reporting on audit 
performance. But what the profession needs are 
“smart”indicators on input and process factors to steer 
on the underlying elements of audit quality. Michael 
de Ridder underlines this need for better diagnoses, by 
saying: “All too often we still find ourselves unable to say why 
defects remain in an audit. That can result in incorrect as-
sumptions about what constitutes an appropriate intervention 
and/or what is required in a new piece of legislation or regu-
lations”. In other words, it is essential to gain a better 
understanding of the deeper-lying root causes. To start 
off with the question: what makes a root cause analy-
sis an effective one? 
5 Areas for research
FAR believes that audit quality can be studied from 
three perspectives, following the definition of audit 
quality by DeFond and Zhang (2014)2:
 • Clients’ control environments, reporting systems 
and innate characteristics: Firms are becoming in-
creasingly complex, in terms of business models, sys-
tems of control, and how the audited firms’ under-
lying economics are reflected in their financial 
statements;
 • Audit firms’ organizational settings and conditions 
for creating an organizational culture and architec-
ture that increases the likelihood of audit staff 
achieving greater assurance and that strengthens in-
cremental learning; and
 • Stakeholders and environmental forces, which may 
include auditors’ communication (effectiveness of 
auditors’ reporting), audit quality from multiple 
stakeholder perspectives, the environmental context 
of the audit (e.g. in terms of audit industry and mar-
kets), and the external supervision and regulatory 
environment. 
Hence, FAR’s focus encompasses the entire financial re-
porting and assurance supply chain. FAR believes that 
research has the potential to identify those factors that 
influence audit quality in daily practice. More specifi-
cally potential interesting areas for research, as under-
scored by the heads of audit in their speeches, are:
 • Audit inputs, such as audit team composition and 
interaction, the personal characteristics of audit 
partners and staff, their workload, and the knowl-
edge, skills, and experience of auditors in relation to 
the complexity and context of the audits they are 
currently performing;
 • The audit process of planning, collection, and inter-
pretation of audit evidence, which may include risk 
assessment, audit methodologies and tools, the in-
trinsic quality of audit evidence, the  nature, timing, 
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and extent of audit procedures, and time and budg-
et (pressures);
 • Auditors’ intentions and behaviors, such as judg-
ment and decision making, professional skepticism, 
partner involvement throughout the audit, dysfunc-
tional auditor behavior, and auditor-client nego- 
tiations regarding audit findings;
 • Audit outcomes, which may include communica- 
tion, such as the usefulness of audit reporting and 
the economic consequences of audit outcomes;
 • Audit firm organization, governance, and culture, 
which may include governance structures, benefit 
schemes, quality control systems and indicators, 
firm and team culture, and the roles of firm net-
works.
Moreover, practitioners call for a comprehensive view 
on the auditing practice, rather than singling out and 
looking at certain elements in isolation, modelling out 
other variables that may impact the phenomenon of 
study. Egbert Eeftink, in this regard, sees auditing as 
a ball game “which needs to take place in a field with at least 
three (and perhaps more) boundaries”. In his view, these 
are:
1. the boundary of functionally appropriate perfor-
mance – i.e. audit quality and audit relevance (or au-
dit value);
2. the boundary of viable economics – this is where pro-
duction efficiency comes in; and
3. the boundary of an acceptable HR workload, includ-
ing talent attraction and development – this includes 
the attractiveness of auditing for the next genera-
tion.
He continues: “So I ask myself: should audit research focus 
on one of the boundaries of the field separately, such as audit 
quality or efficiency? Or should audit research try to look at 
the field more widely, and try to understand how and due to 
which forces the ball moves between the different boundaries?”
In other words, academics are invited to contribute to 
the demystification of the auditing profession with cli-
ents, stakeholders, and the public at large. As was not-
ed by Michael de Ridder: “The tragedy of our profession is 
that our hard work takes place – for the most part – out of sight 
of the public”. 
6  Expectations of FAR and the research community
One of the tasks of FAR is to make current academic 
knowledge and new findings from FAR commissioned 
research accessible for professionals, standard-setters, 
legislators, regulators, and other stakeholders. All af-
filiated audit firms hope to continue strengthening the 
bridge between science and practice by proactive inter-
action through conference, round-table discussions, 
master classes, and above all, intensive collaboration 
on the research projects FAR wishes to commission. 
Through that, the firms believe the Dutch profession 
to lead the way internationally. Expectations from 
practice on the contribution of FAR and the research 
community are thus high, as Michael de Ridder sum-
marizes: 
“Our intentions are good, but we need research for the 
next step. Quite simply because you researchers can 
strengthen and improve our profession. Because you pro-
vide us and our stakeholders with the independent obser-
vations needed for an honest and factual discussion. What 
we want are facts!”
And why wouldn’t research surprise, or even confuse 
audit practitioners? That may really add to break-
through changes in the profession. Is the profession 
prepared to embrace research outcomes that under- 
mine generally held assumptions and paradigms on 
which the current audit practice is build? That the 
Dutch audit firms are open for the challenge, is clear 
from a closing remark of Egbert Eeftink: 
“I think FAR can bridge different scientific disciplines to 
ensure we are looking at audit quality from different 
functional angles. (…) If we do not learn, we lose our rel-
evance and become obsolete. Research by distinguished 
academics can help lift our beautiful profession, provide 
us with better insights into how we work and how we 
learn. And be a better and a proud auditor.”  
Dr. O.P.G. Bik RA is Associate Professor at Nyenrode 
Business Universiteit. He is member of the management 
board of the Foundation for Auditing Research.
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A continuing puzzle, in any case to me, is why most ob-
servers, regulators, journalists, academics, and indeed 
often audit practitioners as well, consider statutory cor-
porate auditing to be in trouble; deep trouble. To these 
observers, statutory auditing has major quality prob-
lems and statutory audit failures are a major problem. 
These concerns exist in the Netherlands and in most ad-
vanced economies. In fact, the only country that appears 
to be unaffected is Belgium. In Belgium statutory au-
diting is seen to do just fine. I live in Belgium.
The puzzle surfaced again during the first FAR Con-
ference that this MAB issue is devoted to. The point I 
will make here is that, in effect, the Belgians see this 
mostly correctly: corporate statutory auditing in the 
world is doing fine most of the time. Audit quality is a 
very worthy object of research and attention, but not 
because of an audit quality crisis.
One of the nice results of auditing regulation in the Eu-
ropean Union, the Auditing Directive, is that it has led 
to a common terminology. That Directive defines the 
statutory audit, the statutory auditor and audit firm, 
engagement partner, public interest entity, regulatory 
oversight of the corporate statutory audit and so on. 
The Directive starts off with a list of these definitions. 
The Directive is the ‘Statute’. It is a written law about 
corporate statutory audits passed by the European Par-
liament. It regulates the auditing of the financial state-
ments of EU companies: corporations to be more pre-
cise. The Directive is part of EU Company Law, hence 
its existence explains which corporations in the EU need 
to undergo a statutory audit. The financial statements 
themselves are regulated in a companion EU Company 
Law Directive: the Accounting Directive. I explain this 
in some detail because I find that Dutch students, be-
ing taught often using US textbooks, sadly are often un-
aware of this set-up. Students form a sizeable, and loy-
al, part of the MAB’s readership. So, hopefully, the 
description of this simple set-up, will help them. One 
more point, enlightening hopefully to the students as 
well: the IFRS regulation, mandating EU listed corpo-
rations to use IASB IFRS, is part of emerging EU Secu-
rities Law, not of EU Company Law.
Why did I just say ‘puzzle’? What is puzzling about this 
widespread belief, but not in Belgium, that statutory 
corporate audits in the EU have a serious quality prob-
lem? The puzzle is this: a careful look at the facts does 
not produce a truly important statutory audit quality 
problem in the EU and elsewhere.
Let us focus on the Netherlands to substantiate this 
proposition. I could do the analysis for other devel-
oped economies as well. The same result would follow. 
Indeed, also in Belgium.
It is very helpful that there is so much information avail-
able about the Dutch market for statutory audits these 
days in the Netherlands. That is also a convenient con-
sequence of the Auditing Directive and its precursors. I 
will use somewhat rounded numbers. It will be straight-
forward to do the analysis in, almost, exact numbers. 
These days there are 18.5 thousand active auditors in 
the Netherlands. About half of them run their own busi-
nesses. That is, they are in private practice. The other 
half are ‘auditors in business or in government’. Of the 
auditors in private practice, 1800 are the Dutch statu-
tory auditors. They are the auditors that can sign off on 
the quality of Dutch audited corporate financial state-
ments. There are, these days, somewhat less than 400 
registered audit firms. They are registered with the Neth-
erlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM). This 
registration also ‘creates’ the registration of the 1800 
statutory auditors working for these firms. A small 
number of Dutch audit firms are, also by the AFM, al-
lowed to audit the financial statements of the most 
prominent, ‘systemically’ important, Dutch companies: 
listed corporations, financial institutions and, in the 
near future, even a number of important non-corporate 
entities (regulated health insurers for instance). These 
companies are, in Auditing Directive terms, Public In-
terest Entities (PIEs). All this forms the supply side of 
the Dutch audit market. 
Note that we can also, these days, observe, on the sup-
ply side, the engagement audit partners by name. This 
is again a consequence of audit regulation. We know 
who they are and from where they work, for which au-
dit firm. We could indeed quite easily find out who these 
1.800 individuals, the statutory auditors in the Nether-
lands, are. It is about the quality of their work that we 
are having a discussion. It is important to keep that in 
mind. This is not an abstract exercise. For instance, the 
2015 AkzoNobel statutory auditor was E.H.J. van Leeu-
wen RA, KPMG Accountants NV. Googling will then 
provide additional information easily. Again, it is pos-
sible to do this in other EU member states as well. 
The demand side of the audit market in the Nether-
lands looks as follows. Some 22 thousand Dutch cor-
porations are mandated to be audited every year. These 
are the large and medium-sized Dutch corporations 
(Accounting Directive defined). Among them are, and 
this is a number that proved somewhat difficult to pre-
cisely establish, 1100 PIEs. There are also voluntary 
(statutory audit based) financial statement audits. We 
know that there are ‘larger’ small Dutch corporations 
that purchase them. How many of these voluntary au-
dits there are is not well known.
How can statutory financial statement audit quality 
Puzzle
Willem Buijink
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be observed in the Dutch audit market in the aggre-
gate? I will use a simple effective approach to giving 
an answer to that question, initiated by Jere Francis 
(2004). Francis, by the way, also spoke at the FAR 
Conference, but about something else. The obvious 
answer is to look for the number of statutory audit 
failures observed in the audit market over a period of 
time and compare that number with the total num-
ber of statutory audits carried out during the same 
period. Suppose we do that for the 2005 to 2014 pe-
riod. A ten year period means that the ‘10 year’ num-
ber of statutory audit failures should be compared 
with the 220 thousand statutory audits carried out 
in the period (or with 11 thousand PIE audits) to de-
termine audit quality in the aggregate. There is no 
‘register’ of audit failures. But, it is obvious that the 
number of statutory audit failures in that period 
dwarfs in comparison to the 220 thousand audits car-
ried out, and to the 11 thousand PIE audits. Even if 
we somehow weighed the audit failures, in terms of 
value destroyed, that is, of consequences, that con-
clusion would still hold. It could be objected that zero 
audit failures is the only acceptable outcome, but that 
is not a serious objection. Failures will occur. The im-
portant thing is to keep its number low.
Why then is there this strong feeling of a general statuto-
ry audit quality problem in the Netherlands? One impor-
tant reason is that observed audit failures are magnified. 
The press does this. Other observers, even practitioners, 
can be seen to do this as well. It is important to see that 
this magnifying behavior is very effective. It does indeed 
create a sense of crisis. That crisis feeling then leads to po-
litical, regulatory reactions and the audit profession re-
acting to those reactions. The recent NBA (Koninklijke 
Nederlandse Beroepsorganisatie van Accountants - The 
Royal Netherlands Institute of Chartered Accountants) 
recommendations list, over 50, for a reform of the Dutch 
audit industry and market is particularly a strong exam-
ple. And of course, creating the FAR is the result of one 
of these recommendations. 
Furthermore, a serious additional audit failures mag-
nifying voice in the Netherlands, surprisingly, is that 
of the Dutch audit market supervisor: the AFM. The 
AFM in recent years has carried out Dutch audit en-
gagement quality investigations and has chosen to 
publicize its finding prominently in the Dutch finan-
cial and general press. Having an active oversight 
body is good of course. Provided that its field research 
is impeccable. Several observers, myself included, have 
criticized the AFM’s research methods regarding this 
issue. So far these critical remarks have been blown 
away by the storm of criticism battering the Dutch 
audit industry, that also the AFM has created. That 
‘storm’ should be seen in perspective, and I provided 
that perspective above. The statutory audit quality 
problem in the Netherlands is not a large problem 
seen in that perspective. So the AFM’s behavior pre-
sents a puzzle in itself.
It would be interesting to find out how the AFM’s stat-
utory audit quality research was received by the other 
28 EU audit market regulators. That would provide yet 
another perspective on the seriousness of the audit 
quality issues in the Netherlands.  As I said, in Belgium, 
calm reigns on the statutory audit quality front. That 
observation alone provides a valuable perspective on 
the Dutch audit quality ‘storm’. How can there be this 
difference between two adjacent countries?
As I explained, FAR can certainly be seen as a product 
of the audit quality ‘storm’. The atmosphere at the 
FAR conference as well. Much discussion was devoted 
to the ‘root causes’ of audit quality problems. Not so 
much by the speakers, but certainly by the audience. 
Audit quality concerns loomed large.
I think it is wise to ‘fight back’ against the ‘storm’ and 
those that created it. I counsel, also to the FAR, a differ-
ent, optimistic, positively spirited, approach to auditing 
research and the need for such research. Statutory audit-
ing, despite its name, was not invented by regulators. Au-
dit demand originates from the creation, also not invent-
ed by regulation, of the corporation as a fundamental 
business contract in a market economy. Given that au-
diting is an important ‘administrative technology’, it is 
important that it continues to improve. It is that which 
creates the fundamental demand for audit quality im-
provement and innovation. This is true for both audit 
firm ‘technology’ and audit regulator ‘technology’. Care-
ful research into audit quality, and innovative design for 
audit quality, both within audit firms and within audit 
oversight bodies, should be the driving force of auditing 
research. A force that comes from within. As well as, and 
I am an academic educator, a driving enlightening force 
for the teaching of auditing and its techniques.
I was involved in an earlier attempt to do just that: the 
Maastricht (Accounting and) Auditing Research Cent-
er (MARC). That was in the early 1990’s. The FAR is a 
much more substantial attempt, this time deeply in-
volving the audit firms themselves. This represents im-
portant progress, which holds a lot of promise for the 
future of auditing research and audit technology in-
novation and design in the Netherlands.  
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Ook vandaag kunnen 70.000 mensen 
het daglicht niet verdragen. 
Het nieuwe Migrainefonds
 zet de aanval in op migraine.
2 tot 2,5 miljoen volwassenen in Nederland hebben migraine – en dan heb-
ben we kinderen en jongeren als Marinske nog niet eens meegeteld. Ook 
vandaag weer hebben 70.000 mensen een aanval. Hoogste tijd dat daar 
verandering in komt. 
Daarom ziet nu een nieuw fonds het daglicht: het Migrainefonds. Om geld 
in te zamelen voor baanbrekend onderzoek om migraine de wereld uit te
helpen. En voor projecten die bijdragen aan een betere kwaliteit van leven.
Want migraine dreunt door, maar jouw bijdrage helpt.
Marinske (16 jr)
 Ga vandaag nog naar migrainefonds.nl en steun het onderzoek.
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